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ABSTRACT

THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE IN THE DIGITAL AGE: EXAMINING
THE FIRST AMENDMENT WHEN STUDENT ELECTRONIC
SPEECH TARGETS SCHOOL EMPLOYEES

Jessica Ann Herrmann, Ed.D.
Department of Leadership, Educational Psychology, and Foundations
Northern Illinois University, 2018
Dr. Christine Kiracofe, Advisor

This paper investigates the intersection of student First Amendment free speech rights
and off-campus electronic speech that targets school employees. Specifically, this study
researched case law involving students who were disciplined as a result of off-campus electronic
speech that targeted a staff member at their school. Analysis of case law and court decisions
provides insight about how courts are interpreting and applying Tinker and other foundational
student speech decisions in today’s era of digital communication. The paper concludes with a set
of recommendations for school administrators around the topic of student electronic speech that
targets school employees. By implementing some of these practices in schools, school
administrators will be better positioned to prevent this type of cyberspeech from occurring and to
respond to it if and when the need arises.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The Internet has dramatically changed the landscape of student expression and
communication. Two decades ago it was easy for administrators to identify where students were
located when they engaged in verbal or written expression; they were either on school grounds or
off school grounds, during the school day or outside of school hours. Today, however, as more
and more students participate in social networking1 and have constant access to the Internet,
student expression in schools is much more difficult for school officials to monitor and control.
In reality, electronic student expression can occur at any moment and in any location, and as a
result can permeate the proverbial schoolhouse gate.
According to a 2015 Pew Research Center study, 92% of teens ages 13 to 17 report going
online daily, and more than half (56%) go online several times a day.2 Nearly three quarters of
teens have access to a smart phone, and nearly one quarter is online “almost constantly.”3 Social
networking makes up a significant portion of this individual Internet use. Among teenagers in the

According to Google Dictionary, social networking is “the use of dedicated websites and
applications to interact with other users, or to find people with similar interests to oneself.” GOOGLE
DICTIONARY, www.google.com (type “What is social networking?”)(last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
1

Amanda Lenhart, Teens, Social Media & Technology Overview 2015, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Apr. 9,
2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/teens-social-media-technology-2015/.
2

3

Id.

2

United States, Snapchat4 is the most frequently used social media platform, with Facebook5 and
Instagram6 following.
Student Cyberbullying
With adolescents spending a significant amount of time on social media, opportunities for
interaction now extend far beyond the school day. This increased communication via the Internet
is in some ways exciting but also potentially concerning. Electronic communication via social
networking sites may be used to enhance relationships and increase collaboration, but it can also
provide a platform for hurtful interpersonal exchanges.
A National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) study found that, during the 2011-12
school year, 27.8% of sixth through twelfth grade students reported having been bullied at school
and 9% reported having been bullied via the Internet.7 Among the students who reported having
been cyberbullied, the following experiences were reported: “[the sharing of] hurtful information
on the internet” (3.6%), “purposely shared private information” (1.1%), “unwanted contact via email” (1.9%), “unwanted contact via instant messaging” (2.7%), “unwanted contact via online
According to Whatis.com, Snapchat is a mobile application that allows users to send and receive
self-destructing photos and videos, called snaps.
http://searchmobilecomputing.techtarget.com/definition/Snapchat (last visited Nov. 18 2017).
4

According to Whatis.com, Facebook is a popular free social networking website that allows
registered users to create profiles, upload photos and videos, send messages, and keep in touch
with others. The site is available in 37 different languages.
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/Facebook (last visited Nov. 18, 2017).
5

According to Whatis.com, Instagram is a free online photo sharing application and social network
platform. http://searchcio.techtarget.com/definition/Instagram (last visited Nov. 18, 2017).
6

Student Reports of Bullying and Cyber-bullying: Results from the 2011 School Crime Supplement to
the National Crime Victimization Survey, INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION SCIENCES (IES) NATIONAL CENTER FOR
EDUCATION STATISTICS, Table 1.1, p. T-1, https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2013/2013329.pdf
7

3

gaming” (1.5%), and “purposeful exclusion from an online community (1.2%).”8 Other studies
have suggested significantly higher rates of cyberbullying. According to a meta-analysis by the
Cyberbullying Research Center, approximately 26% of middle and high school students in the
United States reported having been the victims of cyberbullying at some point in their lifetime.9
Adults as Targets

Adolescents are not the only targets of cyberbullying. During the 2011-12 school year,
nine percent of schoolteachers reported having been threatened with injury by a student from
their school.10 While this statistic does not differentiate between threats made on-campus and
those made off-campus or via the Internet, it shows that teachers are not immune to being targets
of student expression. In fact, the Cyberbullying Research Center dedicates a portion of its
website to support for adult victims of cyberbullying. The site provides a document entitled
“Responding to Cyberbullying: Top Ten Tips for Adults who are Being Harassed Online.” These
tips include “Do not retaliate,” “Talk about it,” “Contact Law Enforcement,” “Cut ties” and
“Block the Bully.”11

8

Id.

Summary of Our Cyberbullying Research (2004-2016). CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CENTER,
http://cyberbullying.org/summary-of-our-cyberbullying-research/ (last visited Nov 18, 2017).
9

Fast Facts: School Crime, INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION SERVICES (IES) NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION
STATISTICS, https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=49 (last visited Nov. 18, 2017).
10

Sameer Hinduja and Justin W. Patchin, Responding to Cyberbullying: Top Ten Tips for Adults who
are Being Harassed Online, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 2013),
http://cyberbullying.org/response_cyberbullying_adults/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2017).
11
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The Cyberbullying Research Center website also provides tips for dealing with fake
Facebook pages, outlining steps an individual should take if they wish to pursue legal action after
viewing a fake profile of themselves. This website acknowledges that, in many cases,
adolescents do not fully understand the consequences of their behavior and create fake profiles as
a joke. In these types of situations, the website authors recommend trying to work through the
problem informally and involving parents and other adults as appropriate. The authors
recommend some proactive measures to prevent students from creating fake profiles of educators
or classmates, including educating students about these issues and creating a positive climate at
school.12 While these suggestions may be helpful in some circumstances, however, they likely do
not provide relief once a school official has been targeted by one or more of their students.
Indeed, a teacher or coach cannot easily block a student from her classroom or cut ties with a
student in the school.
Social Media and Schools

Educators are frequently provided guidance regarding ways to teach students about
digital citizenship and Internet safety. However, many educators have difficulty finding a
balance between being aware of student social media involvement and invading student privacy.
Experts such as danah boyd13 offer guidance on this issue. Specifically, boyd argues that the key
to a successful school-based approach to supporting healthy teen social media usage is fostering

Justin W. Patchin, Help with Fake Facebook Pages, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CENTER (July 25, 2012),
http://cyberbullying.org/help-with-fake-facebook-profile-pages/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2017).
12

danah boyd is the founder and president of Data & Society, researcher at Microsoft Research, and
visiting professor at New York University. She chooses to spell her name without capitalization.
13

5

citizenship. She writes, “We need to help youth be responsible members of society and
[understand] that society is no longer bounded by physical space.”14
In addition to taking an instructional, preventive approach to promoting positive student
electronic media usage, many school officials have utilized disciplinary action as a punitive
response to student cyberbullying. However, the constitutionality of discipline for off-campus
electronic speech is often disputed. On one hand, school officials often feel that they need the
authority to limit student speech in order to maintain school safety and order. On the other hand,
some First Amendment advocates argue that such school policies infringe upon student rights.
For example, expert Clay Calvert15 believes that punishment for student electronic speech
amounts to “a constant, Orwellian problem of school officials trying to stretch their jurisdiction
far beyond campus and into the homes and bedrooms of minors across the country.”16
At least one state has gone a step further than school discipline, turning to state law for
support. In New Hampshire, state officials made it a crime to intimidate or torment teachers
online. Specifically, under a 2013 New Hampshire statute, students can be exposed to potential
criminal sanctions for creating fake online profiles of teachers, posting real images, or making

Benjamin Herold, Teachers, Teens, and Social Media: Q & A with danah boyd, EDUCATION WEEK:
DIGITAL EDUCATION BLOG (Jan. 26, 2016),
http://mobile.edweek.org/c.jsp?cid=25920011&item=http%3A%2F%2Fapi.edweek.org%2Fv1%2
Fblog%2F63%2F%3Fuuid%3D56496&cmp=SOC-SHR-TW.
14

Clay Calvert is Director of the Brechner First Amendment Project, a group that filed a friend-ofthe-court brief to the U.S. Supreme Court to hear a recent student electronic speech decision, Bell v.
Itawamba County School Board, 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015).
15

Recent Briefs, MARION B. BRECHNER FIRST AMENDMENT PROJECT,
http://firstamendment.jou.ufl.edu/pubs/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2017).
16
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any statement online that provokes harassment.17 While some individuals, including
representatives from the ACLU of New Hampshire, have argued this law is unconstitutional, it is
nonetheless currently the law in New Hampshire.
Statement of the Problem

To date, the Supreme Court has declined to hear any cases involving student electronic
speech, leaving the lower courts to establish geographic judicial precedents. Lower courts have
used different standards to reach their verdicts, resulting in sometimes contradictory and
inconsistent rulings. This issue is even further complicated by the fact that technology and the
Internet are changing at such a rapid pace. Every time a new type of smart device appears on the
market, and every time a new social media platform makes its way into the mainstream, new
factors emerge that were never before considered.
The lack of Supreme Court precedent regarding the restriction of student off-campus
electronic speech leaves school officials with little guidance when faced with First Amendment
student electronic speech questions. School officials, responsible for balancing individual student
rights to freedom of speech and a student body’s right to a safe and secure learning environment,
are left to navigate these situations on their own. Without a clear United States Supreme Court
standard to govern student electronic speech, several potential challenges arise. Among these
challenges include inconsistency in school officials’ responses to student electronic speech, risks
to student and staff safety and morale (for example, the potential for threats to be carried out,

Lisa Worf, Cyberbullying Law Shields Teachers from Student Tormenters, NPR (Feb. 19, 2013),
http://www.npr.org/2013/02/19/172329526/cyber-bulling-law-shields-teachers-from-studenttormentors (last visited Jan. 17, 2018).
17
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increased staff and student anxiety, and a decreased overall sense of safety or wellbeing), and a
risk to students’ rights of freedom of expression.
Significance of the Study

With the rise in student Internet and social media use, school officials face more and
more questions about when, and under what circumstances, they have the authority to regulate
off-campus electronic student expression. Student electronic speech that targets public school
employees has the potential to disrupt the school environment and impact the safety and/or
wellbeing of students and staff.
School officials need guidance on the parameters for responding to student off-campus
electronic speech. With such guidance, school officials would be better able to support and
discipline students more consistently. What happens in one school, district, or state should not
differ dramatically from what happens in a similar situation in another school, district, or state.
Developing guidance around issues of off-campus student electronic speech will not only
allow for consistency across schools, but could also help improve school safety. If school
officials had a better understanding of their scope of authority to discipline students around these
issues, they could provide more effective guidance to students and staff to prevent these types of
incidents from occurring. That is, school officials would be better able to explain to students the
legal risks and consequences of engaging in this type of activity over social media, thereby
potentially mitigating some of these issues.
Finally, providing guidance around the legal implications of student off-campus
electronic speech that targets school employees would also help protect students’ First

8

Amendment rights to freedom of speech. Without a clear standard for regulating student off
campus electronic speech, school officials risk violating individual student rights.
Research Questions
The following research questions will guide this study:
1. What is the relevant legal history of public school discipline regarding student speech
in the United States?
2. What do existing court decisions indicate about the balance between a student’s First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and school officials’ authority to regulate
student electronic off-campus speech that targets school officials?
3. How can prior litigation inform current school officials’ decision-making with regard
to imposing disciplinary consequences upon students in response to off-campus
electronic speech that targets school officials?
Limitations of the Study
This study will conduct an extensive search of litigation pertaining to school officials’
authority to impose disciplinary action in response to student off-campus electronic speech
targeting school officials. However, because not all court decisions are published, it is possible
there is additional case law on this subject unavailable to the researcher.

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet decided a student speech case
involving off-campus electronic speech, five of the Court’s decisions are frequently referenced in
the analysis of such cases. Lower courts always apply one or more of these five U.S. Supreme
Court’s decisions: Watts v. United States,18 Tinker v. Des Moines,19 Bethel v. Fraser,20
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier,21 and Morse v. Frederick.22 For this reason, an understanding of these
Supreme Court decisions is an important component in examining the intersection of the U.S.
Constitution and student off-campus electronic speech.
The Supreme Court and the “True Threat”

The first of these decisions did not address students or schools but nevertheless remains
relevant in the analysis of some student off-campus speech cases. This case, Watts v. United
States,23 involved the intersection of threatening speech and the First Amendment.
18

Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).

19

Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).

20

Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).

21

Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).

22

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).

23

Watts, 394 U.S. at 705.

10

Watts v. United States24
In August 1966, a group of people held a public rally on the Washington Monument
grounds.25 During the rally, individuals broke out into small group discussions. During one
discussion about police brutality, a group member suggested that the young people present
should get more education before expressing their views.26 In response, Watts, an 18 year-old
man in the group, commented that he had received a draft classification and was expected to
report for a physical the following Monday. He further stated, “I am not going. If they ever make
me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J. . . . They are not going to make
me kill my black brothers.”27
The following day the Secret Service arrested Watts for threatening the life of the
President.28 Following a trial in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, a
jury convicted Watts of violating a 1917 federal statute prohibiting any person from “knowingly
and willfully…[making] any threat to take the life or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of
the United States . . .”29 The jury found that Watts had committed a felony by knowingly and
willfully threatening the President.

24

Id.

25

Id. at 705.

26

Id.

27

Id.

28

Watts v. United States, 402 F.2d 676, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1968).

29

Watts, 394 U.S. at 705.

11

Watts appealed the conviction to the United States Circuit Court for the District of
Columbia, arguing that his speech was protected by the First Amendment.30 Watts contended
there was no evidence showing he had made a threat against the life of the President. He asserted
that his speech had been uttered during a political debate and was expressly made conditional
upon an event that would never occur – namely, his induction into the Armed Forces. The Court
of Appeals concluded that the First Amendment did not protect speech that knowingly and
willfully threatened the life or safety of the President.31 Finding that the jury had reasonably
interpreted Watts’s speech to be a threat against the President, the Court of Appeals affirmed
Watts’s conviction.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that the Nation had a valid
interest in protecting the President from threats of physical violence.32 However, the Court
pointed out, this interest must be balanced against individuals’ First Amendment right to free
speech. The Court stated, “What is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally
protected speech.”33 The Court further explained that comments uttered during a political debate,
such as Watts’s speech, might sometimes be abusive, inexact, and include attacks on the
government and/or public officials.34 However, observing that Watts’s audience had responded

30

Id.

31

Watts, 402 F.2d at 682.

32

Watts, 394 U.S. at 707.

33

Id.

34

Id.

12

to his speech with laughter, the Court concluded that no “true threat” had been made. The
Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court decision and ruled in favor of Watts.35
Though Watts determined that the First Amendment did not protect “true threats,” the
decision stopped short of providing a clear standard for the level of intent needed for a true
threat.36 For several years following Watts, courts turned to cases interpreting other categories of
unprotected speech in attempts to create a consistent test for true threats.37 In 2003, the Supreme
Court further defined the contours of the “true threat” exception in Virginia v. Black.38 Citing
Watts, the Court in Black defined true threats as “encompassing those statements where the
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”39 While this ruling provided slightly
more clarity, the Black decision failed to truly clarify the “true threat” definition for lower
courts.40
Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor, in a recent concurring opinion of the Supreme Court’s
denial of certiorari in a Florida case,41 attempted to provide further clarification of a true threat.
Sotomayor wrote, “Together, Watts and Black make clear that to sustain a threat conviction
35

Id.

Adrienne Scheffey, Defining Intent in 165 Characters or Less: A Call for Clarity in the Intent
Standard of True Threats After Virginia v. Black, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 861, 871 (2015).
36

37

Id.

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). In Black, the Supreme Court held that a statute prohibiting
cross burning with the intent to intimidate was constitutional. Virginia, 538 U.S. at 359.
38

39

Id. at 359.

40

Scheffey, supra note 36 at 874.

41

See Perez v. State, 189 So. 3d 797, 855 (Fla. 2016) (Sotomayor, S., concurring).

13

without encroaching upon the First Amendment, States must prove more than the mere utterance
of threatening words- some level of intent is required.”42
The Supreme Court and Student Freedom of Speech
The other four Supreme Court cases, Tinker v. Des Moines,43 Bethel v. Fraser,44
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier,45 and Morse v. Frederick,46 serve as the foundation for analysis of all
student speech cases – both electronic and non-electronic, off-campus and on-campus. In order
to understand courts’ reasoning in cases involving student electronic speech that targets school
employees, it is critical to have an understanding of these Supreme Court decisions.
Tinker v. Des Moines47

In 1969, the Supreme Court issued the first of its four student free speech decisions,
Tinker v. Des Moines.48 In December 1965, a group of students in Des Moines, Iowa planned to
publicize their objections to the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War by wearing
black armbands to school. The armbands symbolized mourning for those who had died in the

42

Id.

43

Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).

44

Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).

45

Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).

46

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).

47

Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).

48

Id.

14

war and represented the wearers’ support for a truce.49 At this time, the Nation was experiencing
unrest over the United States’ involvement in the war. Examples of this unrest included a protest
march in Washington, D.C. and several protests throughout the country involving the burning of
draft cards.50
Upon hearing about the students’ plan to wear the armbands to school, the school
district’s Director of Secondary Education met with the school district’s five high school
principals to decide how to respond. With the goal of maintaining a disciplined classroom
atmosphere amidst the country’s unrest over the Vietnam War, Des Moines school officials
decided to prohibit students from wearing the armbands to school. The policy emerging from this
December 14 meeting warned, “any student wearing an armband to school would be asked to
remove it, and if he refused he would be suspended until he returned without the armband.”51
On December 16, Mary Beth Tinker, a 13 year-old junior high school student, and
Christopher Eckhardt, a 16 year-old high school student, each wore a black armband to their
respective school. The next day John Tinker, a 15 year-old high school student and Mary Beth’s
brother, wore an armband to the high school he attended.52 Notwithstanding the school district’s
regulation prohibiting the armbands, the students wore the armbands to mourn those who had
died in the Vietnam War and to support Senator Robert F. Kennedy’s proposal for a truce.53 As a
consequence of violating the newly promulgated armband policy, each student was suspended
49

Tinker v. Des Moines, 258 F. Supp. 971, 972 (S.D. Iowa 1966).

50

Id. at 973.

51

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505.

52

Tinker, 258 F. Supp. at 972

53

Id.

15

from school. Following the school district’s winter break, each student returned to school
without an armband.54
The students’ parents challenged the suspensions by filing a complaint in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The lawsuit alleged that school officials’
prohibition against wearing armbands to school violated their children’s First Amendment free
speech rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.55 The district court found that school
authorities’ disciplinary action was a reasonable measure designed to prevent a school
disturbance. The court’s opinion cited the Fifth Circuit’s earlier decision in Burnside v. Byars.56
In Burnside, the Fifth Circuit had concluded that students could not be prevented from wearing
protest buttons to school unless the buttons would create a material and substantial interference
with the operation of the school.57 However, in light of the Tinker facts, the district court
reasoned that school officials should be granted wider discretion than was granted in Burnside.
Specifically, the court reasoned that school officials should have the latitude to prohibit speech
they believed would lead to a material and substantial school disturbance.58 Finding Des Moines
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school officials could have reasonably anticipated that the armbands would cause a disruption,
the district court ruled in favor of school officials. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision without opinion.59
The parents appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. In its decision, the
Tinker majority observed that students who attended public schools possessed fundamental
constitutional rights.60 The Court characterized the wearing of the armbands as symbolic speech,
which was akin to “pure speech” meriting protection under the United States Constitution.61 The
Court noted that the students had been quiet and passive when wearing the armbands, had not
been disruptive, and had not impinged on the rights of others. Based upon these observations, the
Court reasoned that the armbands constituted protected speech under the First Amendment’s
Free Speech Clause.62
In order to lawfully prohibit students from wearing the armbands to school, the Court
concluded, school officials needed to show that the armbands either caused an actual disruption
or that a disruption could be reasonably predicted. This conclusion led the Court to formulate the
two-pronged “substantial disruption,” test, or Tinker test, for determining whether school
officials could constitutionally regulate in-school student speech.63 The Tinker analysis asks
whether the student’s speech would: 1) “materially and substantially disrupt the work and
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discipline of the school”64 or 2) collide with the “rights of other students to be secure and to be
left alone.”65 If either prong of this inquiry is satisfied, school officials are authorized to restrict
student in-school speech.66
Applying this two-pronged test to the present situation, the Court concluded that Des
Moines school officials had not shown they had sufficient reason to believe the armbands would
disrupt the school environment.67 The Court rejected the district court’s reasoning that the
suspensions were permissible because this disciplinary consequence was based upon a fear that
wearing the armbands would cause disruption within the school. Indeed, the High Court inferred
that the district court’s opinion had relied upon the conclusion that school officials’ motivation
for disciplining the students centered around a desire to avoid controversy over the country’s
involvement in the Vietnam War, rather than an attempt to prevent disruption.68 The Court noted,
“Undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to
freedom of expression.”69 The Court further pointed out that many statements uttered by students
during the school day could potentially cause trouble, inspire fear, or cause a disturbance.
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However, the Court pointed out, such potential alone did not provide sufficient justification for
censoring a student’s Constitutional right to freedom of speech.70
The Tinker Court noted that Des Moines school officials had not previously prohibited
students from wearing controversial symbols to school.71 For example, school officials had
allowed students to wear the Iron Cross, traditionally a symbol of Nazism, to school. As such,
the Court concluded that the black armbands worn in opposition to the United States’
involvement in Vietnam had been singled out for prohibition based upon the message they
communicated. The Court pointed out that this type of viewpoint discrimination was not
constitutionally permissible.72
The Court found no facts that would have reasonably led school officials to anticipate the
armbands would cause a substantial disruption in the schools, and in fact no disruption had
occurred as a result of the students wearing the armbands. Because the students expressed their
viewpoints without interfering with the school environment or intruding on the lives of others,
the Court concluded it had not been permissible for school officials to prohibit their speech.
Based upon these conclusions, the Court majority reversed the lower courts’ decisions and ruled
for the students.73
In dissent, Justice Black argued that the armbands had caused disruption within the
school.74 Specifically, Justice Black argued that students had been distracted from their lessons
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and talked about the armbands and about the Vietnam War instead of their studies. Justice Black
further asserted the majority’s decision afforded students, rather than school officials, the
authority to make decisions about appropriate speech in school.75 Justice Black observed:
I, for one, am not fully persuaded that school pupils are wise enough, even with this
Court’s expert help from Washington, to run the 23,390 public school systems in our 50
states. I wish, therefore, wholly to disclaim any purpose on my part to hold that the
Federal Constitution compels the teachers, parents, and elected school officials to
surrender control of the American public school system to public school students. I
dissent.76
Bethel v. Fraser77

Eighteen years after Tinker, the Supreme Court addressed questions involving the
offensive content of a student speech delivered during a school-sponsored assembly. On April
26, 1983, Matthew Fraser, a student at Bethel High School in Pierce County, Washington,
delivered a speech during a school assembly. The speech nominated a fellow student who was
running for a student council office.78 During the speech, Matthew referred to the candidate
using “elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.”79 The speech included phrases such as
“he’s firm in his pants… his character is firm,” “a man who takes his point and pounds it in,” and
“a man who will go to the very end—even the climax, for each and every one of you.”80
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Before the assembly, two of Matthew’s teachers had warned him the speech was
inappropriate and that there might be “severe consequences” if he delivered it.81 Matthew
eschewed these warnings and delivered the speech. During the assembly a school counselor
observed some students in the audience who appeared to be embarrassed. The following day one
teacher also reported that she found it necessary to forego a portion of a class lesson in order to
discuss the speech with her class.82 The morning after the assembly, the assistant principal
informed Matthew that his speech had violated a school rule prohibiting “conduct which
materially and substantially interferes with the educational process… including the use of
obscene, profane language or gestures.”83 As a disciplinary consequence Matthew was
suspended for three days, and his name was removed from the list of candidates for graduation
speaker.
Matthew sought review of the disciplinary action through the school district’s grievance
procedures and requested a hearing. At the hearing, the hearing officer determined that
Matthew’s speech had been “indecent, lewd, and offensive to the modesty and decency of many
of the students and faculty in attendance at the assembly.”84 The hearing officer considered the
content of Matthew’s speech “obscene” as defined by the school district’s disruptive conduct
rule and therefore affirmed the disciplinary action.85
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Matthew and his father filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington, alleging that school officials had violated Matthew’s First Amendment
right to freedom of speech.86 In defense, school officials argued that Matthew’s speech had
disrupted the educational process. They reasoned that school officials had an obligation to
protect a captive audience of minors from offensive language in a school-sponsored event and
contended that school officials had authority to control the language used during a schoolsponsored event.87 Notwithstanding these assertions the district court ruled in favor of Matthew,
finding that the disciplinary action violated Matthew’s First Amendment rights. On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment, finding that Matthew’s speech was
comparable to the armbands in Tinker.88
The school district appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision to the Supreme Court. The Court
opened its opinion by discussing the purpose of public education, which included helping
students develop an understanding of socially appropriate behavior. The opinion observed that
expectations of socially appropriate behavior existed within all spaces of our Nation, from the
halls of Congress to public spaces.89 Thus, the Court reasoned, a primary function of schools was
to help students understand and adhere to these social expectations. The opinion stated, “Surely it
is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and
offensive terms in public discourse.”90
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The Court drew a distinction between the political symbolism of Tinker’s armbands and
the sexual content of Matthew’s speech. Matthew’s speech, the Court pointed out, was distinct
from Tinker’s armbands in that Matthew’s speech was unrelated to any political viewpoint.
Given this distinction, and recognizing school officials’ legitimate interest in protecting minors
from offensive speech during school activities, the Court reasoned that it was within school
officials’ authority to punish Fraser for his offensive speech.91 The Court noted, “it was perfectly
appropriate for the school to disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils that vulgar speech
and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school
education.”92 Ultimately, the Fraser decision established that school officials could prohibit lewd
or offensive student speech delivered during a school-sponsored assembly.
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier93
The third of the Supreme Court’s student speech decisions, Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier,94 considered school officials’ authority to censor student articles written for
publication in a school-sponsored high school newspaper. In 1983, three students in Hazelwood
School District in St. Louis County, Missouri filed suit against their school district and school
officials. The students claimed that school officials violated their First Amendment speech rights
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by deleting two pages of articles from an edition of the school newspaper.95 At the time, the
practice at Hazelwood East High School was for the journalism teacher to submit page proofs of
each newspaper issue to the principal for review prior to publication. In accordance with this
policy, on May 10, the newly hired newspaper advisor delivered the proofs of the May 13 issue
to the school principal for review. The principal had concerns with two of the articles. One of the
articles described three students’ experiences with pregnancy, and the other article discussed the
impact of divorce on students.96
The principal feared that readers of the pregnancy article might be able to determine the
identities of the students whose pregnancies provided the article’s context. He also was
concerned that the article’s references to sexual activity and birth control were inappropriate for
some of the school’s younger students. Regarding the article about divorce, the principal was
concerned because the article named the student who had complained about her father. The
principal also believed the student’s parents should have been given an opportunity to respond to
the student’s remarks or been asked to provide consent for publication of their daughter’s
comments.97 Believing there was no time to make changes to the stories before the press run, the
principal concluded that his only options were to either eliminate the two pages containing the
focus of his concerns or not publish the newspaper. He directed the journalism teacher to delete
the two pages containing the stories on pregnancy and divorce.98
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The students filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, claiming that the principal’s censorship of the student articles violated their First
Amendment speech rights.99 The District Court found that no First Amendment violation had
occurred. Specifically, the court concluded that school officials were permitted to censor student
speech in activities that were integrally connected to the school’s educational function, including
the publication of a school-sponsored newspaper, so long as their censorship had a reasonable
basis.100
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s
decision.101 The Eighth Circuit declared that since the newspaper was “intended to be and
operated as a conduit for student viewpoint,” the school newspaper should be treated as a public
forum.102 Therefore, because the newspaper was a public forum, The Eighth Circuit reasoned
that school officials were only entitled to censor the contents of the newspaper when appropriate
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under the Tinker standard. Finding no evidence that the principal could have forecast the articles
would lead to any material and substantial disruption within the school, the Eighth Circuit held
that the deletion of the two pages violated the students’ First Amendment rights.103
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Eighth
Circuit’s decision.104 Citing Fraser, the Court recognized that school officials had the right to
determine the appropriateness of student speech uttered in a school assembly or within a
classroom.105 The Court dismissed the appellate panel’s conclusion that the newspaper
constituted a forum for public expression. In rejecting the public forum characterization, the
Court observed that Hazelwood East school officials had historically been entitled to regulate the
content of the newspaper in a reasonable manner, per Board policy. Therefore, the Court found
that the public forum classification was not supported by the facts.106
The Court also drew a distinction between tolerating a student’s personal in-school
expression, such as the Tinker armbands, and regulating school-sponsored student expressive
activities that were part of the school curriculum. The Court held that school officials were
entitled to exercise greater control over student expression within the context of a schoolsponsored activity. Specifically, the Court pointed out that school officials could ensure the
speech in question serves its intended educational purpose, is appropriate for the maturity level
of the readers or listeners, and that the views of the speaker are not attributed to the school.107
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The Court observed that school officials must be able to set high standards for student speech
disseminated as part of a school-sponsored activity and therefore must have the authority to
refuse to disseminate speech that does not meet those standards.108
Given school officials’ authority to consider the content of school-sponsored speech and
the maturity level of the audience, the Supreme Court reasoned that the Tinker analysis would
not be appropriate for determining when school officials have authority to regulate schoolsponsored student expression.109 Instead, the Court formulated an alternate analysis to be applied
to school-sponsored student expression. The Court held that school officials could regulate
student speech uttered in conjunction with school-sponsored activities as long as such regulation
was “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”110
Applying this new student speech test, the Supreme Court determined that the principal’s
censorship of the student newspaper articles was justified. According to the Court, the principal
had reasonably concluded that the students who wrote the articles had not mastered the
curriculum within their Journalism II class. This conclusion was based upon the students having
not demonstrated an understanding of how to treat controversial issues or protect the privacy of
individuals, nor a full appreciation of the legal, moral, and ethical guidelines within the school
journalism context.111 Because the articles did not meet the standards set forth in the journalism
class and textbook, the Court reasoned that the principal‘s censorship was justified. As a result,
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the Court reversed the Eighth Circuit’s decision and ruled the principal’s censorship of the
school-sponsored newspaper had not violated the students’ First Amendment speech rights.112
Morse v. Frederick113

Almost 20 years later, the Supreme Court heard another student speech case, Morse v.
Frederick.114 On January 24, 2002, students from Juneau-Douglas High School (JDHS) in
Juneau, Alaska were released from school to observe the Olympic Torch Relay as it passed in
front of their high school. Students stood at the side of the street to observe the relay, while
teachers and administrators supervised.115
Joseph Frederick was an 18 year-old JDHS senior. Joseph had not attended school on the
morning of the relay because he had been stuck in the snow in his driveway, but he arrived in
time to join his friends on the street to watch the event.116 As the torchbearers and camera crews
passed by, Joseph and his friends unfurled a 14-foot banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”117
The banner was easily readable by the students and by the principal, Deborah Morse, who were
standing on the other side of the street.
Principal Morse immediately crossed the street and directed the students to take the
banner down, and everyone but Joseph complied. When Joseph refused, Morse confiscated the
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banner and later suspended Joseph for 10 days.118 She explained that she had told Joseph to take
the banner down because she thought it encouraged illegal drug use, in violation of school
policy.119
Joseph appealed his suspension to the district superintendent, who upheld the suspension.
The superintendent concluded that Joseph’s suspension was warranted because he had displayed
the banner at a school-sanctioned activity in the midst of fellow students. The superintendent
further explained that Joseph had been disciplined because his speech appeared to advocate the
use of illegal drugs.120 Joseph appealed his suspension to the school board, where it was
sustained.121
Joseph filed suit in the U.S. District court for the District of Alaska, alleging the school
board and Principal Morse had violated his First Amendment free speech rights. The district
court first concluded that viewing the parade had constituted a school-sponsored event. The court
reached this conclusion based on several facts: Principal Morse had authorized teachers to take
their classes to view the relay, the band and cheerleaders were organized to greet the relay
participants, and school officials monitored students throughout the event.122 The district court
granted summary judgment for the school board and Morse, finding the principal had the
authority, if not the obligation, to stop messages that could be reasonably interpreted as
Morse, 551 U.S. at 398. Note: The Ninth Circuit’s opinion indicates that Principal Morse saw the
banner, crossed the street, and grabbed and crumpled up the banner before suspending Frederick.
Morse, 439 F.3d at 1115.
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promoting illegal drug use. Citing Fraser, the court pointed out school officials had authority to
censor lewd or offensive student speech. This observation led the district court to reason that
Joseph’s banner could be censored because its message expressed a contradiction of the Board’s
policies relating to drug abuse prevention.123
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit concluded that Tinker, not
Fraser, should govern Joseph’s speech. The court noted that the message conveyed on Joseph’s
banner was not sexual, like the speech in Fraser, and was not “plainly offensive.”124 Applying
Tinker, the Ninth Circuit found the school district had violated Joseph’s free speech rights
because the banner had not caused substantial disruption to the school.125
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Ninth Circuit’s
decision.126 The Court observed that the principal could have reasonably perceived the banner as
promoting illegal drug use in violation of school policy.127 Discussing the Tinker, Fraser, and
Hazelwood decisions, the Court noted Fraser’s express acknowledgement that Tinker was not
the only basis for restricting student speech.128 The Court further explained that Hazelwood was
not applicable because Joseph’s banner could not be characterized as school-sponsored speech.
That is, while Joseph displayed his banner in a school-sanctioned event, he was not acting as a
representative of the school when he displayed it. Nonetheless, the majority pointed out,
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Hazelwood had acknowledged that school officials had authority to regulate some types of inschool student speech that might not otherwise be regulated outside of the school setting.129
The Court acknowledged concerns about drug use among the nation’s youth and
emphasized the role of schools in educating students about the dangers of illegal drug use.130 The
Court reasoned that, in Joseph’s case, the principal saw a banner she believed promoted illegal
drug use and made an immediate decision about whether and how to respond. The Court agreed
with Principal Morse’s response, noting, “Failing to act would send a powerful message to the
students in her charge, including Frederick, about how serious the school was about the dangers
of illegal drug use.”131
In conclusion, the Fraser Court did not rely on Tinker, Fraser, or Hazelwood, but instead
established another test altogether. Acknowledging school officials’ interest in deterring drug use
by schoolchildren, the Court declared that school officials could restrict student speech at a
school event when the speech could be reasonably interpreted as promoting illegal drug use.132
Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, finding that Joseph’s First
Amendment rights had not been not violated when his banner was prohibited at a schoolsponsored event.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Alito agreed that school officials could restrict student inschool speech that threatens students’ physical safety, such as speech advocating illegal drug use.
Alito made it clear, however, that his concurring opinion did not “endorse any further extension”
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of Tinker’s substantial disruption standard.133 As such, Justice Alito pointed out that Morse did
not extend the authority of school officials to restrict student speech that could “plausibly be
interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue.”134

Student Electronic Speech

Though numerous student off-campus electronic speech cases have sought Supreme
Court review,135 the Court has declined each invitation. Lower courts, however, have decided
several cases around this topic. Interestingly, despite the media focus on cyberbullying, or
student-to-student bullying online, the majority of the student off-campus speech cases decided
by the lower courts have involved student speech targeting school officials.136 Many of these
cases have involved student speech appearing on websites, mySpace profiles, or blog posts
created by students using home computers outside of school hours.
The following section provides an overview of these cases. Courts grapple with a variety
of issues in determining whether student off-campus speech can be regulated. These issues
include nexus (i.e., the connection between the speech and the school), lewd or offensive speech,
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speech containing threatening language, and the location of the speech. Relevant student offcampus electronic speech cases are presented chronologically below, and an analysis of
emerging trends and future implications will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
Beussink v. Woodland137
In 1998, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri decided
Beussink v. Woodland, one of the first cases involving student off-campus electronic speech. In
February 1998, Brandon Beussink, a junior at Woodland High School in Marble Hill, Missouri,
created a website using his home computer outside of school hours. The website contained
vulgar language and conveyed Brandon’s negative opinions about his teachers, principal, and the
school’s website.138 Brandon’s website invited readers to contact the school principal to
communicate their opinions about the school. The website also contained a hyperlink to the
school’s website.
Brandon testified that he had not intended for the website to be accessed or viewed at
school.139 Nonetheless, one of Brandon’s friends borrowed Brandon’s home computer and
viewed his website from home. Apparently wanting to retaliate against Brandon following an
argument with him, the friend re-accessed the website while on school grounds and showed it to
the computer teacher.140 The teacher, upset by the website’s content, informed the principal. The
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principal viewed the website and immediately made the decision to discipline Brandon.141 The
principal later explained he had disciplined Brandon because he was upset by the website having
been displayed in a classroom. It is unclear how many times the website was viewed at school
that day, as there was no evidence indicating that Brandon had shown it to other students.
Further, there was no evidence that any disruption had occurred as a result of the website being
viewed.142
Later that day, Brandon received notice of a 10-day suspension.143 He spoke with the
principal, but the principal would not reconsider the disciplinary action. Brandon deleted the
website when he arrived home that afternoon and thereafter served his suspension.144 As a
consequence of his suspension and the school district’s policy on unexcused absences (which
included days of suspension), Brandon failed all of his classes for the semester.145
Brandon’s parents, on his behalf, filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri, alleging that school officials had violated his First Amendment
rights to freedom of speech.146 The district court noted the principal had disciplined Brandon
because he was upset over the website’s content, not because of a fear the website would cause a
disruption. The court pointed out that disliking the content of a student’s speech was not an
acceptable justification for limiting it, stating, “Individual student speech which is unpopular but
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does not substantially interfere with school discipline is entitled to protection.”147 Ultimately, the
court ruled for the student, finding that the principal’s decision to suspend Brandon had violated
his free speech rights.148 The school district did not appeal.
Killion v. Franklin149
In 2001, a Pennsylvania district court decided a similar case involving a student’s offcampus electronic speech targeting a school official. During the 1998-99 school year, Zachariah
Paul was a student at Franklin Regional High School in Pennsylvania.150 In March 1999, while at
home after school hours, Zachariah composed a “Top Ten” list targeting the high school’s
athletic director, Robert Bozzuto. Zachariah was apparently angered after hearing about the rules
and regulations being imposed upon members of the track team.151 The “Top Ten” list contained
statements regarding Bozzuto’s appearance, including the size of his genitals.152 The list included
the following statements:
10) The School Store doesn’t sell twinkies.
9) He is constantly tripping over his own chins.
8) The girls at the 900 #’s keep hanging up on him.
7) For him, becoming Franklin’s “Athletic Director” was considered “moving up in
the world”
6) He has to use a pencil to type and make phone calls because his fingers are unable
to hit only one key at a time.
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5) As stated in previous list, he’s just not getting any.
4) He is no longer allowed in any “All You Can Eat restaurants.”
3) He has constant flashbacks of when he was in high school and the athletes used to
pick on him, instead of him picking on the athletes.
2) Because of his extensive gut factor, the “man” hasn’t seen his own penis in over a
decade.
1) Even if it wasn’t [sic] for his gut, it would still take a magnifying glass and
extensive searching to find it.153
Zachariah emailed the list to friends from his home computer. He neither printed nor distributed
copies of the list at school, because he had copied and distributed similar lists in the past and
been warned he would be punished if he brought another list to school.154
Several weeks later, another student reformatted Zachariah’s email and distributed the
document on school grounds.155 Copies were found at both the high school and middle school.
Thereafter, Zachariah was called to a meeting with the school principal, assistant principal, and
Bozzuto. During this meeting school officials questioned Zachariah about the list, and Zachariah
admitted he had created the list and emailed it to several friends from his home computer.156
However, he denied bringing the list onto school grounds. Zachariah was instructed to bring a
copy of the email to school the next day. He agreed and was allowed to return to class. 157
The next day, Zachariah and his mother met with the principal and Bozzuto. School
officials informed Zachariah’s mother that Zachariah was being suspended for ten days. They
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indicated that the suspension was issued as a consequence of Zachariah having made offensive
remarks about a school official and the fact the list was found on school grounds. The principal
also informed Zachariah’s mother that Zachariah would not be allowed to participate in any
school-related activities, including track and field events, during the suspension.158 The next day,
Zachariah and his family received a certified letter advising them of the ten-day suspension for
“verbal/written abuse of a staff member.”159
Zachariah and his family filed a lawsuit in the Westmore County Court of Common
Pleas, Pennsylvania. They contended school officials had violated Zachariah’s First Amendment
rights of free expression by suspending him for speech that had originated off school grounds in
the privacy of his home.160 School officials argued that Zachariah’s suspension was appropriate
because he had violated school policy and because the speech was disruptive, lewd, obscene, and
had the potential to disrupt school administration.161
The parties entered into a settlement agreement whereby Zachariah and his parents would
withdraw their complaint in exchange for a suspension hearing. After this suspension hearing,
which resulted in a ten-day suspension, Zachariah and his family filed a civil lawsuit in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Zachariah’s family alleged
that school officials had violated Zachariah’s First and Fourteenth Amendments when they
suspended him.162 The parties entered into an agreement, allowing Zachariah to return to school.
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In addressing the speech claim, the district court considered the Tinker, Fraser, and
Hazelwood decisions. Considering school officials’ substantial disruption claim, the court
examined cases involving school officials punishing students for off-campus speech, including
Emmett v. Kent School District No. 415,163 Buessink v. Woodland R-IV School District,164 and
J.S. v. Bethlehem.165 This analysis led the district court to observe that the Tinker analysis could
probably be applied when student off-campus speech made its way to campus, even if another
student brought the speech to campus.166 The court also noted that the majority of courts had
applied Tinker in analyzing both on- and off-campus student speech. As a result, the Court
applied Tinker to Zachariah’s speech.
Applying Tinker, the district court concluded that school officials had failed to provide
evidence that Zachariah’s speech had led to a substantial disruption.167 There was no evidence
that teachers were incapable of teaching or controlling their classes, nor did the speech cause any

Emmett v. Kent School District, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000). In February 2000, the
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington ruled that a high school
student’s First Amendment freedom of speech rights were violated when he was suspended for a
website he created from his home. The website contained some commentary on school
administration and faculty, including mock obituaries of two of the student’s friends as well as a
vote on whose mock obituary might be written next. The district court found no evidence of intent
to threaten, actual threat, or manifestations of violent tendencies, and granted the injunction.
163
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J.S. v. Bethlehem, 569 Pa. 638 (Pa. 2002). This case was going through lower courts around the
same time as Killion. This case will be discussed later in the literature review.
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Minn. 1987); Sullivan v. Houston, 307 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D. Tex. 1969); Baker v. Downey, 307 F. Supp.
517 (C.D. Cal. 1969); and Pangle v. Bend-Lapine, 169 Or. App. 376 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
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faculty member to take a leave of absence, as had occurred in J.S.168 Therefore, the court
determined Tinker’s disruption prong had not been met.169
The court also noted Fraser had allowed school officials to limit student speech if it was
lewd, vulgar, or profane.170 The court observed, “Courts considering lewd and obscene speech
occurring off school grounds have held that students cannot be punished for such speech, absent
exceptional circumstances.”171 The court noted that several passages from Zachariah’s list were
“lewd, abusive, and derogatory.”172 In accordance with Thomas v. Board of Education173 and
Klein v. Smith,174 though, the court found that Paul’s speech was not punishable since it occurred
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Thomas v. Board of Education, 607 F.2d 1043 (2nd Cir. 1979). In 1979, the Second Circuit ruled
on a case involving a student-published newspaper that was published and distributed by several
students off-campus. The newspaper, entitled “Hard Times,” was critical of the school environment.
School officials suspended the students for publishing the offensive publication, and the students
filed suit, claiming a violation of their First Amendment rights. The Second Circuit found that the
suspension was indeed a violation of the students’ free speech rights, as the authority of school
officials did not extend beyond the school day.
173

Klein v. Smith, 635 F.Supp. 1440 (Dist. Me. 1986). In 1986, a District Court in Maine held that
school officials lacked authority to punish a student for conduct that did not occur on school
grounds or during the school day. School officials had suspended a high school student, Jason Klein,
after he raised his middle finger toward a teacher when they saw one another in a parking lot after
school hours. The court found that school officials could not establish that the vulgar gesture would
adversely impact the operation of the school, ruling in favor of Klein.
174
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in Zachariah’s home away from school premises and was not associated with his role as a
student.175
In conclusion, the district court held that school officials had violated Zachariah’s First
Amendment rights. This decision was based upon the following observations: school officials
had failed to provide evidence of a substantial disruption, Zachariah’s speech was not
threatening, and the speech did not cause any faculty member to take a leave of absence. Though
school officials found the “Top Ten” list offensive, the court cited Beussink in noting that
disliking the content of a student’s speech was not an acceptable justification for limiting it.176
The court determined that Zachariah’s First Amendment rights had been violated.177 The school
district did not appeal.
J.S. v. Bethlehem178
The following year, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided another early case
involving student off-campus electronic speech.179 In the spring of 1998, J.S., an eighth grade
student at Nitschmann Middle School in the Bethlehem Area School District, created a website
on a home computer outside of school hours.180 The website was titled “Teacher Sux” and
consisted of several webpages containing derogatory comments about J.S.’s principal, Mr.
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Kartsotis, and algebra teacher, Mrs. Fulmer. The website included statements such as “Why
Does Kartsotis suck?...He sees Mrs. Derrico [another employee within the school district]…He
sees Mrs. Derrico naked… He fucks Mrs. Derrico,” and “Why Fulmer Should be Fired…She
shows off her fat fucking legs… The fat fuck smokes… She’s a bitch!”181 A webpage also stated
“Why Should She Die?” and went on to say “(Take a look at the diagram and the reasons I gave,
then give me $ 20.00 [sic] to help pay for the hitman [sic].) Some words from the writer: Fuck
you Mrs. Fulmer. You are a Bitch. You are a Stupid Bitch.”182 Another page included a diagram
of Mrs. Fulmer with her head cut off and blood dripping from her neck.183
A teacher learned about the website through an anonymous email and reported it to the
principal, who convened a faculty meeting and informed the faculty there was a problem in the
school.184 The principal contacted the local police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
to investigate. As a result, J.S. was identified as the website’s creator. Additionally, the principal
immediately informed Mrs. Fulmer, because he took the website threats seriously.185
The record indicated that the principal and his family were embarrassed by the website
and that Fulmer was frightened that someone would try to kill her.186 Fulmer experienced
adverse effects from having viewed the webpage, including stress, anxiety, headaches, loss of
appetite, loss of sleep, loss of weight, and a sense of lost well-being. Fulmer applied for and was
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granted a medical sabbatical leave for the 1998-99 school year because of her inability to return
to teaching.187 School officials also determined the website “had a demoralizing impact on the
school community,”188 resulting in “a feeling of helplessness and…plummeting morale”189
among members of the school community.
In July 1998, school officials sent J.S. and his family a letter indicating J.S. would be
suspended for three days. The letter stated J.S. had committed three serious offenses in violation
of school district policy: “threat to a teacher, harassment of a teacher and principal, and
disrespect to a teacher and principal.”190 After a hearing on the suspension, J.S.’s suspension was
extended to ten days. Thereafter, school officials initiated expulsion proceedings against J.S.191
J.S.’s parents enrolled J.S. in an out-of-state school for the 1998-99 school year. The
expulsion hearings were conducted in August 1998. During the expulsion proceedings, school
officials determined: 1) the statement “Why Should Mrs. Fulmer die?...give me $20 to help pay
for the hitman [sic]” constituted a threat to a teacher and was perceived by the teacher and others
as a threat; 2) the statements regarding the principal and teacher constituted harassment; 3) the
statements constituted disrespect to a teacher and principal, resulting in actual harm to the school
community; 4) the School District Code of Conduct prohibited such student conduct; and 5) the

187

Id. at 417.

188

Id.

189

Id.

190

Id. at 415.

191

Id.

42

statements caused harm to Mrs. Fulmer as well as other students and teachers.192 Based on these
conclusions, the school board voted to permanently expel J.S. from school.193
J.S.’s family appealed the expulsion and filed suit in the Northampton County Court,
claiming J.S.’s First Amendment speech rights had been violated. The trial court affirmed the
expulsion decision.194 J.S.’s family then appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.
This appellate court considered Tinker and Fraser in analyzing whether J.S. could be disciplined
as a consequence of his off-campus Internet speech.195 The Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania cited Donovan v. Ritchie,196 Fenton v. Stear,197 and Beussink v. Woodland,198 all
cases where the courts had upheld school officials’ discipline of students for off-campus speech
deemed to have substantially interfered with the educational process.199
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Donovan v. Ritchie, 68 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1995). In 1995, the First Circuit addressed the issue of
whether a student was denied due process when he was suspended for three days and prohibited
from participating in school events and athletics. The First Circuit ruled that the school did not
violate a Massachusetts law prohibiting suspension of a student for conduct that was not connected
with school-sponsored activities.
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Fenton v. Stear, 423 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Pa. 1976). The Western District Court of Pennsylvania
ruled that a student’s First Amendment Freedom of Speech rights were not violated when he was
suspended for three days based on conduct that occurred off of school grounds. The District Court
determined that the student’s act of saying “He’s a prick” when a teacher passed by him at the mall
on a Sunday evening constituted “fighting words,” which are not protected by the First Amendment.
Thus, the student’s complaints were dismissed.
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The court concluded that J.S.’s speech had substantially disrupted the educational
process. Specifically, the court observed that the website had a damaging effect on Fulmer, as
evidenced by the emotional and physical effects she suffered after viewing the website’s violent
pictures and solicitation of funds to cover the cost of a hit man.200 The court also referenced
Fraser’s finding that schools “must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social
order”201 and could therefore prohibit student speech that was lewd, offensive, or indecent. The
court concluded J.S.’s speech met the Fraser standard and found the school officials’ imposition
of disciplinary consequences permissible.202 In conclusion, given the substantial disruption that
occurred as a consequence of J.S.’s website and the offensive, lewd content of the website, the
court found the disciplinary consequences imposed upon J.S. were permissible under both Tinker
and Fraser.203
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Friedman disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that
J.S. did not have First Amendment protection because Fulmer reasonably saw the website as a
threat.204 Friedman argued the record showed that school officials had not perceived the website
as a “true threat” as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Watts.205 Friedman offered several
arguments for this conclusion. First, even after school officials had identified J.S. as being
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responsible for creating the website, they took no action to have J.S. remove the site.206 In
addition, they never investigated whether J.S. had indeed collected any money for a hit man,
never separated J.S. from faculty or other students, and never warned any faculty that J.S. posed
a possible threat. Further, the School District did not take any action to suspend the student until
several months after discovering the website.207 For these reasons, Friedman argued, it was
apparent the School District did not take the “hit man” portion of the website seriously.
Friedman also concluded the involvement of the FBI was inconsistent with the school
officials’ other actions. Friedman wrote, “Delegating the investigation to criminal prosecutors
while permitting Student to remain on school premises, to interact with other students and
faculty and to engage in school sponsored activities is inconsistent with the severe action
subsequently imposed on Student.”208 For these reasons, Friedman would have found that school
officials abused their discretion in deciding to expel J.S.
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with Friedman’s dissent, opining that
the website did not constitute a true threat.209 This conclusion was based upon the court’s
observation that J.S.’s website speech had “not reflect[ed] a serious expression of intent to inflict
harm.”210 While the court noted the importance of taking all student threats against students or
faculty seriously, it reasoned, “Distasteful and even highly offensive communication does not
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necessarily fall from First Amendment protection as a true threat simply because of its
objectionable nature.”211
Next, the appellate court considered the location of the speech, finding there was a
sufficient nexus between the website and the school campus to treat the speech as having
occurred on-campus.212 Specifically, although the website had been created at an off-campus
location, J.S. had accessed it at school and shown it to another student. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court determined that because J.S.’s speech had been viewed on-campus, it could be
limited based on both Fraser’s restriction of lewd, vulgar, and offensive on-campus student
speech and Tinker’s substantial disruption standard. The court found J.S.’s speech to be lewd,
vulgar, and offensive, finding it punishable according to Fraser.213 In conclusion, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s finding that school officials
had not violated J.S.’s First Amendment speech rights when they expelled J.S.214
Wisniewski v. Board of Education215
In 2007, the Second Circuit decided its first case addressing school officials’ authority
over student Internet speech. In April 2001, Aaron Wisniewski, an eighth grade student at
Weedsport Middle School in upstate New York, used his parents’ home computer and AOL
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Instant Messaging (IM) software to send an IM to 15 people.216 The message contained a small
drawing of a pistol firing a bullet at a person’s head, with dots representing splattered blood.
Beneath the drawing appeared the words “Kill Mr. VanderMolen.” Philip VanderMolen was
Wisniewski’s English teacher.217
VanderMolen became aware of the icon and forwarded it to the high school and middle
school principals, who notified local police, the school district superintendent, and Aaron’s
parents.218 School officials suspended Aaron for five days. After the suspension, Aaron was
allowed to return to school pending a superintendent’s hearing.219
The superintendent’s hearing, held before a hearing officer, occurred in May 2001 and
was decided in June. The hearing officer found the icon threatening and concluded that Aaron
had violated school rules and disrupted school operations.220 The Board of Education approved
the hearing officer’s recommendation that Aaron be suspended for one semester. As a result,
Aaron was suspended for the first semester of the 2001-02 school year.221
In November 2002 Aaron’s parents filed suit in the District Court for the Northern
District of New York, claiming school officials had violated Aaron’s First Amendment freedom
of speech rights by suspending him. Aaron’s parents argued that Aaron’s Internet posting was
protected by the First Amendment and alleged that school officials had acted in a retaliatory
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manner by suspending him.222 The district court, referencing the Supreme Court’s Watts
decision, determined that Aaron’s icon could have been reasonably construed to be a “true
threat” and thus lacked First Amendment protection.223
On appeal, the Second Circuit decided not to address the issue of whether Aaron’s icon
constituted a “true threat,” reasoning that the Watts standard was not appropriate for application
to Aaron’s speech.224 In explanation, the opinion stated, “School officials have significantly
broader authority to sanction student speech than the Watts standard allows.”225 Instead, the
Second Circuit found Tinker to be a more appropriate tool for analysis. The Second Circuit
focused on the issue of Aaron’s intent. Specifically, according to the court, it had been
reasonably foreseeable that school officials would eventually see the IM icon and that the icon
would create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment.226 Given the
reasonably foreseeable risk of substantial disruption, the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court’s decision that Aaron’s First Amendment rights had not been violated by his suspension.227
In deciding Wisniewski, the Second Circuit relied upon Tinker to formulate a twopronged test. Specifically, the court ruled that students could be disciplined for off-campus
speech that included violent content where (1) there was a reasonably foreseeable risk the speech
would come to the attention of school officials, and (2) there was a reasonably foreseeable risk
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the speech would materially and substantially disrupt the discipline of the school.228 Aaron
appealed the case to the Supreme Court, but the Court denied certiorari.
Doninger v. Niehoff229

A year after the Wisniewski decision, the Second Circuit decided a case involving Avery
Doninger. Avery was a high school junior, a Student Council member, and Junior Class
Secretary at Lewis Mills High School (LMHS) in Burlington, Connecticut. 230 In 2007, LMHS
administrators and Student Council members were attempting to schedule and plan their annual
battle-of-the-bands concert, Jamfest.231 Jamfest had been previously postponed twice due to
delays in the opening of LMHS’s new auditorium. Shortly before the rescheduled Jamfest date,
the Student Council was advised that either the date or location of the event would need to
change because an auditorium worker who needed to facilitate the event was not able to attend
on the new date.232
Student Council members were concerned, as they believed that Jamfest needed to occur
on the rescheduled date in the new auditorium in order to ensure all bands could participate.233
Avery and three other student council members decided to alert community members and solicit
the community’s help in persuading school officials to let Jamfest occur as scheduled. The
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students sent emails to several email addresses obtained from an account belonging to one of the
student’s fathers.234 The email stated that the LMHS administration had decided Student Council
could not hold Jamfest in the auditorium because an employee who worked in the auditorium
was not available.235 The email asked recipients to contact the district superintendent and tell her
that Jamfest must be held as scheduled. Recipients were also asked to forward the email to as
many other people as possible.236
The school district superintendent and principal received several telephone calls and
emails from people expressing concerns about Jamfest’s scheduling. Thereafter, Principal
Niehoff encountered Avery in the hallway at LMHS and indicated she was disappointed that
Student Council members had resorted to a mass email rather than working collaboratively with
school officials to resolve the issue.237 Principal Niehoff told Avery she was amenable to
rescheduling Jamfest so that it could be held in the auditorium and asked Avery to send a
corrective email. Avery agreed to do so.238
That night, Avery posted a message on her publicly accessible blog. Her blog post began
as follows:
jamfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office. here is an email that we sent to a
ton of people and asked them to forward to everyone in their address book to help get
support for jamfest, basically, because we sent it out, Paula Schwartz [Superintendent] is
234
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getting a TON of phone calls and emails and such. we have so much support and we
really appreciate it. however, she got pissed off and decided to just cancel the whole thing
all together. anddd [sic] so basically we aren’t going to have it at all, but in the slightest
chance we do it is going to be after the talent show on may 18th. andd...here is the letter
we sent out to parents.239

The post also included the email message Student Council members had sent that morning, along
with the contents of an email Avery’s mother had sent to Superintendent Schwartz earlier in the
day. In the introduction to the letter from her mother, Avery wrote, “And here is a letter my mom
sent to Paula [Schwartz] and cc’d Karissa [Niehoff] to get an idea of what to write if you want to
write something or call her to piss her off more. im down… [sic]”240
The following day, school officials met with the Student Council members who were
involved in sending the initial email. Student Council members and school officials agreed to
reschedule Jamfest to a date in June.241 After this meeting, the principal and superintendent
continued to receive phone calls and emails. Superintendent Schwartz first became aware of
Avery’s blog post a few days after the meeting, when her adult son found it on the Internet. 242
The superintendent notified the principal of Avery’s blog post, and the principal concluded
Avery’s conduct had failed to display the good citizenship expected of class officers. In addition,
Avery had disregarded the principal’s suggestions regarding appropriate ways to raise concerns
239

Id. at 44.

240

Id.

241

Id.

242

Id. at 46.

51

with school administrators.243 Principal Niehoff decided Avery should be prohibited from
running for Senior Class Secretary, but she did not confront Avery immediately due to the
Advanced Placement exams taking place at that time.244
On May 17, Avery went to the principal’s office to accept her nomination for Senior
Class Secretary. There, the principal handed Avery a printed copy of Avery’s blog post and
requested that Avery apologize to the superintendent in writing, show a copy of the post to her
mother, and withdraw her candidacy for the Senior Class Secretary office.245 Avery apologized
to Superintendent Schwartz and showed her mother the blog post, but she refused to withdraw
her candidacy. In turn, the principal declined to endorse Avery’s nomination. The principal’s
denial of the endorsement prohibited her from running for Senior Class Secretary.246 As a result,
Avery was not allowed to have her name on the ballot or deliver a campaign speech at a school
election assembly.247
Avery’s mother, Lauren Doninger, filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut, alleging the principal had violated Avery’s First Amendment freedom of
speech rights by denying her the opportunity to run for the student government office.248 The
district court cited Wisniewski in concluding that Avery’s blog entry should be treated as on-
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campus speech.249 Finding Avery’s speech comparable to Fraser’s offensive speech, the district
court reasoned school officials had acted within their authority in punishing Avery for her
offensive speech.250 The court ruled in favor of school officials.251
Avery’s mother appealed the decision to the Second Circuit. She argued that her
daughter’s speech was protected under Tinker and Wisniewski, since the speech originated within
the confines of the Doningers’ home and was not likely to cause substantial disruption within the
school environment.252 The Second Circuit panel applied Wisniewski, concluding it had been
reasonably foreseeable Avery’s speech would come to school officials’ attention. Also, the panel
pointed out that under a Tinker analysis, Avery’s posting had created a risk of substantial
disruption within the school.253
This conclusion was based on three factors. First, the language Avery used was both
offensive and potentially disruptive to school officials’ efforts to work with student council
members to resolve the Jamfest scheduling issue.254 Second, Avery’s post included misleading or
false information designed to solicit more emails and calls to Schwartz. Specifically, Avery had
stated that Jamfest had been cancelled, when in fact the event was, at the time of the post, in the
process of being rescheduled.255 Finally, not only did Avery’s speech potentially disrupt efforts
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to settle the Jamfest scheduling issue, but it had also complicated the operation of the school’s
student government activities.256 Specifically, Avery’s conduct had undermined the values that
student government was designed to promote, such as working cooperatively with advisors and
administration and promoting good citizenship.257
In its conclusion, the court acknowledged that its ruling might have been different had
school officials imposed a different type of consequence. The panel explained, “We are mindful
that, given the posture of this case, we have no occasion to consider whether a different, more
serious consequence than disqualification from student office would raise constitutional
concerns.”258 Nevertheless, upon reviewing the evidentiary record, the panel concluded that
Avery’s blog post had created a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption within the school and
that Ms. Doninger had failed to clearly show that her daughter’s First Amendment rights had
been violated.259 Therefore, based upon a Tinker analysis, the court affirmed the district court’s
finding in favor of school officials. Doninger appealed the case, but the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari.
Evans v. Bayer260
In 2010, a Florida district court ruled in a case involving a student’s use of Facebook. In
November 2007, Katherine Evans was a senior at Pembroke Pines Charter High School.261
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Katherine created a Facebook group in which she posted the comments, “Ms. Phelps is the worst
teacher I’ve ever met! To those select students who have had the displeasure of having Ms. Sarah
Phelps, or simply knowing her and her insane antics: Here is the place to express your feelings of
hatred.”262 The page was created on Katherine’s home computer after school hours and included
Ms. Phelps’s photograph. Katherine removed the posting after two days. Following the removal,
the school principal became aware of the posting.263
The principal suspended Katherine from school for three days due to “Bullying/Cyber
Bullying/Harassment towards a staff member” and “Disruptive Behavior.”264 In addition, the
principal transferred Katherine from Advanced Placement classes into lesser-weighted honors
courses. Katherine filed suit against the principal in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida, arguing the principal’s actions had violated her First Amendment
free speech rights.265
The district court reasoned that, while student off-campus speech was generally
protected, it could be subject to analysis under Tinker if the speech raised on-campus
concerns.266 The court first concluded that the speech should be treated as off-campus speech.
Next, the court concluded that school officials had not produced sufficient evidence that a
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substantial disruption could be reasonably forecast as a result of Katherine having created the
Facebook group.267
The court then applied Fraser. The principal had argued that Katherine’s speech could be
regulated due to its lewd and vulgar content.268 The court rejected this argument, pointing out
Katherine’s Facebook group did not involve the same type of speech that was at issue in Fraser.
Specifically, Katherine’s speech had neither undermined educational values nor occurred within
the school setting.269 The court declared, “For the Court to equate a school assembly to the entire
internet would set a precedent far too reaching.”270
Finally, the court addressed school officials’ argument that Katherine’s speech was not
protected because it constituted libel. Here, the court reasoned, Katherine’s speech was an
opinion and did not meet the definition of either libel or defamation.271 Ultimately, the district
court ruled that Katherine’s speech failed both Tinker’s substantial disruption test and Fraser’s
lewd or vulgar speech standard. The court pointed out that Katherine’s speech was never
accessed at school and had not caused a disruption of the school environment. For these reasons,
the court ruled in Katherine’s favor, finding that the suspension had violated Katherine’s free
speech rights.272 The principal did not appeal.
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Doninger v. Niehoff II273

After Avery Doninger graduated from high school, she was substituted for her mother as
plaintiff in seeking damages for the alleged violation of her constitutional rights.274 The district
court again found in favor of school officials, and Avery appealed the decision to the Second
Circuit. In her appeal, Avery argued that the case should be reconsidered in light of new facts.
Specifically, according to Avery, the facts did not support a finding that the principal had
informed Avery her behavior was inappropriate for a class officer and that the mass email
contained inaccurate information.275 In addition, Avery contended that there were some factual
disputes to address: first, whether the principal obtained Avery’s assurance that her email would
be corrected, and second, whether Avery’s blog post claiming Jamfest had been cancelled was
false.276
Assessing Avery’s assertions in the light most favorable to Avery, the Second Circuit
pointed out that under Tinker it had been objectively reasonable for school administrators to
conclude the posting was potentially disruptive.277 The court noted that the blog post directly
pertained to a school event, invited other students to read and respond to the post by contacting
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school officials, solicited student comments, and had, in fact, come to the attention of school
administrators.278
Avery also argued the court should consider the principal’s motives for disciplining her.
Specifically, Avery claimed the principal had forbidden her to run for office because she had
found the content of her blog post to be offensive – not because she had anticipated the post
would cause a disruption.279 Avery asserted that this factual dispute should have rendered the
district court’s grant of summary judgment erroneous.280
In response to this argument, the court cited Lowery v. Euverard,281 a Sixth Circuit
decision addressing students’ First Amendment rights and exclusion from extra-curricular
activities. In Lowery, the Sixth Circuit concluded that high school football players had a right to
free speech (in this case, writing negative blog posts about their coach) but did not have a right to
continue playing for the coach while undermining his authority.282 Similarly, Avery’s discipline
extended only to her role as a student government representative, as she was not suspended from
classes or punished in any other way. Because the role of a student council representative was to
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help maintain a communication channel between students, faculty, and administration, the
Second Circuit reasoned, “[I]t was not unreasonable for [the principal] to conclude that
Doninger, by posting an incendiary blog post in the midst of an ongoing school controversy, had
demonstrated her unwillingness properly to carry out this role.”283 As such, pursuant to Tinker, it
was objectively reasonable for school officials to have concluded that Avery’s behavior was
potentially disruptive of student government functions and to have determined that she was not
free to engage in such behavior while serving as a class representative.284 In conclusion, the
Second Circuit again affirmed the district court’s ruling, finding Avery’s First Amendment rights
had not been violated.285
J.S. v. Blue Mountain286

The same year as the Second Circuit decided Doninger II, the Third Circuit decided a
case involving a student’s fake Internet profile of her school principal.287 In March 2007, J.S., an
eighth grade student in Blue Mountain School District and her friend K.L., a fellow eighth grade
student at the same school, created a fake MySpace profile of their principal, James McGonigle.
The students created the profile using J.S.’s parents’ home computer.288

283

Doninger, 642 F.3d at 351.

284

Id. at 358.

285

Id.

286

J.S. v. Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d 915 (3rd Cir. 2011).

287

Id.

288

Id. at 920.

59

The MySpace profile contained an official photograph of the principal from the school
website but did not identify him by name, school, or location. The profile was presented as a
self-portrayal of a bisexual middle school principal named M-Hoe and contained crude content
and vulgar language, including personal attacks on both the principal and his family.289 The
profile listed some of M-Hoe’s interests as “detention, being a tight ass, riding the fraintrain [Ms.
Frain, a school counselor, was the principal’s wife], spending time with my child (who looks like
a gorilla), baseball, my golden pen, fucking in my office, hitting on students and their
parents.”290 According to J.S.’s deposition, the profile was intended to be a joke between J.S. and
her friends.
Initially the profile could be viewed by anyone who knew the URL or who found it by
searching MySpace. The day after creating the profile, J.S. made the posting private after several
students approached her at school indicating they had seen it.291 The record showed that no Blue
Mountain students had been able to view the profile from the school because the school district’s
computers blocked access to MySpace.292
The principal learned about the profile from a student who was in his office to discuss a
separate incident.293 The principal asked the student to attempt to find out who had created the
profile, and the student came back later that day reporting J.S. had created it. The principal asked
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the student to bring a copy of the profile to school the next day, and the student obliged.294 The
next day, the principal showed the profile to the superintendent, the director of technology, and
two guidance counselors. Because the profile contained a false accusation about a staff member,
the principal decided the profile constituted an infraction of the school’s disciplinary code.295 He
also concluded that the profile’s use of a school district photograph violated both copyright law
and the school district’s computer use policy.296
The principal met with J.S. and her mother. During this meeting, he showed J.S.’s mother
the profile and placed J.S. on a 10-day out-of-school suspension. The principal notified the
superintendent of the suspension, who supported his decision.297 Thereafter, J.S. and her parents
filed a lawsuit against the school district in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, alleging a violation of J.S.’s First Amendment freedom of speech
rights.298
School officials asserted that J.S.’s profile had disrupted school in the following ways:
First, students were discussing the profile in classes, with one teacher reporting he had to tell his
students to stop talking about the profile three times. Also, the school counselor’s job activities
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had been disrupted, as the counselor had cancelled student appointments in order to meet with
J.S. and her mother.299
The district court granted the school district’s summary judgment motion on all claims.300
The court held that Tinker did not govern the case because no “substantial and material
disruption” had occurred. Instead, the district court relied upon Fraser, reasoning that the
school’s disciplinary action was applicable because the profile included vulgar and lewd
language. The court also indicated that J.S.’s speech was akin to the speech that promoted illegal
activities in the Morse case, noting, “The speech at issue here could have been the basis for
criminal charges against J.S.”301 The district court found that the nexus, or connection, between
J.S.’s off-campus speech and the school campus was sufficient in justifying the imposition of
disciplinary consequences.302
J.S. and her parents appealed, and the Third Circuit first affirmed the district court’s
ruling. The court ruled that J.S.’s speech could be regulated under Tinker due to its potential to
cause a substantial disruption within the school.303 Thereafter, the Third Circuit granted J.S. and
her parents’ petition for rehearing en banc. The Third Circuit’s en banc ruling cited Tinker,
noting the facts did not support a finding that school officials could have reasonably forecast the
profile would produce a substantial disruption within the school.304 The Third Circuit
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distinguished the Doninger blog from J.S.’s fake MySpace profile by observing that J.S. had not
intended for her speech to reach the school; rather, she had made efforts to prevent others from
viewing the profile by making the profile private.305 With this reasoning, the Third Circuit
implied that the speaker’s intent should be considered in the Tinker analysis.306 Therefore, the
Third Circuit indicated that in order for student electronic speech to be regulated due to a
substantial disruption, the speaker must have intended for speech to reach campus.307
Next, the en banc panel addressed school officials’ argument that J.S.’s speech could
have been prohibited under Fraser, due to its lewd and offensive content.308 Here the Third
Circuit concluded that Fraser was not applicable to J.S.’s case because Fraser had not involved
student off-campus speech.309 The panel reasoned that applying Fraser to J.S.’s speech would
extend Fraser beyond its reasonable scope. Essentially, it would allow school officials to punish
students for offensive speech originating anywhere, at any time, as long as the speech was about
either the school or a school official.310
Ultimately, the Third Circuit reversed both the district court’s holding and the earlier
panel’s decision. The en banc Third Circuit held that school officials had violated J.S.’s First
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Amendment free speech rights by suspending her for creating the profile.311 The en banc court
expressed concern about allowing school officials too much authority over student behavior,
stating, “an opposite holding would significantly broaden school districts’ authority over student
speech and would vest school officials with dangerously overbroad censorship discretion.”312
School officials appealed to the Supreme Court, but the Court denied certiorari.
Layshock v. Hermitage313

On the same day as the three-member panel of the Third Circuit made its initial ruling on
J.S, a separate Third Circuit panel ruled on a similar case involving student electronic speech in
Layshock v. Hermitage School District.314 In December 2005, Justin Layshock was a seventeen
year-old senior at Hickory High School in Hermitage School District in Hermitage,
Pennsylvania. Justin created a parody profile of his principal, Eric Trosch, on MySpace.315 The
parody was created at his grandmother’s house during non-school hours. Justin used a
photograph copied from the school’s website and designed a profile based upon answers to
various survey questions. He centered the profile around the theme of “big.” For example, he
answered questions as follows:
“Are you a health freak? (Answer – “big steroid freak”);
“In the past month have you smoked?“ (Answer – “big blunt”);
311
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“In the past month have you been on pills?” (Answer – “Big pills”);
“In the past month have you gone Skinny Dipping?” (Answer – “Big lake, not
big dick.”); and
“In the past months have you Stolen Anything?” (Answer – “Big keg.).”316
Justin listed other students in the school district as “friends” on his MySpace website,
thereby affording them access to the profile.317 Students found the profile and, by mid-December
2005, three other students had also posted similar fake, unflattering profiles of the principal on
MySpace. Each of these profiles was more vulgar and offensive than Justin’s. The principal
became aware of these profiles and found them to be “degrading,” “demeaning,” “demoralizing,”
and “shocking.”318 He asked the school’s technology director to disable access to the websites
from school, but students continued to find ways to access the profiles.319
School officials learned that Justin might have been the author of one of the profiles.320 In
a meeting with the superintendent, co-principal, and Justin’s mother, Justin admitted to creating
one of the profiles.321 On January 3, 2006, school officials sent a letter to Justin and his parents,
notifying them that an informal hearing would be conducted as a result of Justin’s violation of
the School District Disciplinary Code. Specifically, the letter indicated that Justin’s creation of
the profile amounted to disrespect, disruption of the normal school process, harassment of a
316
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school administrator via the Internet, obscene language, and a computer policy violation (i.e. use
of school pictures without authorization).322
The hearing officer found that Justin was responsible for all of the charges against him.
School officials imposed the following disciplinary consequences: a 10-day out-of-school
suspension, placement for the remainder of the school year in the Alternative Education Program
(a segregated area of the high school generally reserved for students with behavior and
attendance problems), exclusion from participation in all extracurricular activities, and exclusion
from participation in the graduation ceremony.323 The Layshocks were also informed that school
officials were considering expelling Justin. Justin, despite having created the “least vulgar and
offensive profile”324 and being the only student to apologize, was the only student punished for
the MySpace profiles.325
The Layshocks filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Pennsylvania on January 27, 2006, claiming that the disciplinary consequences violated Justin’s
First Amendment speech rights. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Justin
and against school officials.326 The court concluded that Fraser did not justify the school
officials’ disciplinary actions, since Fraser involved in-school student speech and did not extend
school officials’ authority to discipline students for lewd and profane off-campus speech.327
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Further, the district court found that the suspension could not be justified under Tinker because
school officials had failed to establish a sufficient nexus between Justin’s speech and a
substantial disruption of the school environment. Notably, three other profiles of the principal
were available on MySpace.com, so any alleged disruption could not be solely attributed to
Justin’s profile.328 In addition, the court ruled, “the actual disruption was rather minimal – no
classes were cancelled, no widespread disorder occurred, and there was no violence or student
disciplinary action.”329 For these reasons, the district court ruled in Justin’s favor.
School officials appealed the decision to the Third Circuit, where the district court’s
ruling was affirmed.330 School officials petitioned for and were granted a rehearing en banc.
School officials argued that Justin had created a sufficient link between his profile and the school
district by accessing the school district’s website to obtain the principal’s photograph.331 The en
banc panel found this argument “unpersuasive at best.”332 In coming to this conclusion the court
relied upon Thomas v. Board of Education,333 a case examining the nexus between student
conduct and the school environment. In Thomas, the Second Circuit ruled that school officials
violated students’ free speech rights when they suspended students for producing and selling a
satirical publication outside of school.334 The students had only created and distributed the
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publication after school and off-campus, so the Second Circuit found there was not a sufficient
nexus allowing the school to exercise authority.335
Applying Thomas, the en banc panel addressed the location of Justin’s speech.336 The
court concluded that the relationship between Justin’s profile and the school was “far more
attenuated”337 than had existed in Thomas, given that Justin had created the profile while at his
grandmother’s house on her computer. The panel stated, “It would be an unseemly and
dangerous precedent to allow the state, in the guise of school authorities, to reach into a child’s
home and control his/her actions there to the same extent that it can control the child when
he/she participates in school sponsored activities.”338
The en banc panel next addressed school officials’ claim that Justin’s speech should be
considered “on-campus” speech because it was aimed at the school community, was accessed on
campus by Justin, and would likely come to the attention of school officials.339 Relying upon
Fraser, school officials had argued the First Amendment should not protect Justin’s profile
because the speech was vulgar, lewd, offensive, and “ended up inside the school community.”340
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School officials also referenced several previous student electronic speech cases341 that allowed
school officials to respond to vulgar student speech posted on the Internet.
The en banc court disagreed, reasoning that Justin’s punishment was not appropriate
under Fraser because there was no evidence Justin had engaged in lewd or profane speech
within the school setting.342 The majority of the en banc panel reasoned, “Fraser [did] not allow
the School District to punish Justin for expressive conduct which occurred outside of the school
context.”343 Citing Tinker, the panel further pointed out, “[we] have found no authority that
would support punishment for creating such a profile unless it results in foreseeable and
substantial disruption of school.”344
The Third Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s decision that Justin’s conduct
had not disrupted the school and that his use of the school district’s website had not constituted
entering the school. The court concluded that school officials had violated Justin’s First
Amendment rights by suspending him.345 School officials filed a consolidated appeal with J.S. v.
Blue Mountain, but the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.
In its petition to the United States Supreme Court, school officials expressed the need for
the Supreme Court to both address the inconsistencies in lower court decisions and to determine
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the appropriate analytical standard to be applied to student off-campus speech.346 An amicus
brief filed by several national professional educator organizations347 in support of petitioners
argued that public school officials needed authority to regulate off-campus student speech in
order “to further their educational mission” and to maintain order within the school.348 In
opposition, J.S.’s attorneys argued that, while the question of whether Tinker and Fraser applied
to off-campus speech was indeed important, neither Blue Mountain nor Layshock was a suitable
vehicle for addressing this question.349 In response to the Supreme Court’s decision not to rule on
this issue, various law students and lawyers proposed legal tests and recommendations for school
officials to consider in the absence of a Supreme Court precedent.
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R.S. v. Minnewaska350

The following year, a Minnesota federal district court decided a case involving a middle
school student who was punished after making postings on her Facebook wall.351 R.S., a 12 yearold sixth grade student at Minnewaska Area Middle School, made two postings on Facebook.
The first posting expressed her dislike of a school employee, a hall monitor “Kathy.” It stated,
“[I hate] a Kathy person at school because [Kathy] was mean to me.”352 R.S.’s posting was
created at home outside of school hours and was designed to be accessible by her Facebook
friends but not by the general public.
According to R.S.’s complaint, one of R.S.’s Facebook friends viewed and recorded the
message about Kathy.353 Shortly thereafter, the school principal viewed the message. The
principal met with R.S. and told her he considered the message to be impermissible bullying. He
required R.S. to apologize to the hall monitor and gave her a detention as a consequence for
behavior described in disciplinary records as “rude/discourteous” and “other.”354 Following this
incident, R.S. published a second message on Facebook stating, “I want to know who the f%$#
[sic] told on me.”355 In response to this posting, R.S. was given a one-day in school suspension
and was prohibited from attending a class ski trip. These consequences were a response to
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behavior considered “insubordination” and “dangerous, harmful, and nuisance substances and
articles.”356 R.S. filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota,
alleging school officials had violated her First Amendment rights to freedom of speech by
disciplining her for her Facebook posts.357
Relying upon Tinker, Watts, and Wisniewski, the court held that out-of-school speech was
protected under the First Amendment and not punishable by school authorities unless it: a) posed
a true threat, or b) was reasonably calculated to reach the school environment and was so
egregious as to pose a serious safety risk or other substantial disruption to the school.358 The
court ruled that R.S.’s Facebook wall postings did not constitute threats and were not likely to
cause substantial disruption in school. The court stated, “The facts alleged in Plaintiffs’
complaint place R.S.’s speech in the heartland of protected nonviolent and nondisruptive out-ofschool speech.”359 Finding R.S.’s freedom of speech rights had been violated, the court ruled in
favor of R.S.360
Sagehorn v. Independent School District No. 728361

Three years later, a different judge in the same district court in Minnesota ruled in a case
involving a high school student who responded to a post on Twitter. In February 2014, Reid
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Sagehorn was an honor student and athlete at Rogers High School in Minnesota. He had been
admitted to North Dakota State University, pending completion of remaining high school
courses.362
On January 26, 2014, someone anonymously posted the following on a website titled
“Roger Confessions:” “did @R_Sagehorn3 actually make out with [name of female teacher at
Rogers High School]?”363 In response to this question, Reid posted “actually yes.”364 Reid
created this post outside of school hours while he was off-campus. Thereafter, the parent of a
student contacted school officials and expressed concern about the postings, and Reid was
summoned to the principal’s office.365
In the principal’s office, the principal and a police officer asked Reid about the website
and about his post. Reid admitted he had authored the post and it was meant to be sarcastic. He
also stated he had not intended for anyone to believe it to be true.366 Later Reid was again
summoned to the principal’s office and placed upon a five-day suspension. The principal told
Reid’s mother that Reid was being suspended because he had “damaged a teacher’s
reputation.”367 The suspension notice indicated Reid had committed the offense of “threatening,
intimidating, or assault of a teacher, administrator, or staff member.”368
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A few days later, the principal called Reid’s parents and informed them that Reid’s
suspension was being extended for another five school days and that a recommendation for
expulsion would be presented to the School Board. At this time, Reid’s parents told the principal
they disapproved of the decision and felt the punishment was excessive.369 Soon after, Reid’s
mother requested an open hearing and meetings with school officials.
During meetings with the superintendent and assistant superintendent, Reid’s parents
expressed their view that the punishment was excessive and unwarranted.370 School officials told
the Sagehorns they could contest the expulsion in a hearing but indicated that a hearing would be
meaningless because the outcome had already been determined. School officials also warned
Reid’s parents that school officials would consider increasing the expulsion through the
remainder of the school year if the parents requested a hearing.371 The parents were further
warned that an expulsion would likely result in North Dakota State University withdrawing
Reid’s early acceptance. Reid’s parents alleged school officials made it appear their only real
option was to withdraw Reid from school.372 School officials presented Reid’s parents with a
pre-drafted withdrawal agreement, which Reid’s parents signed.373
Reid filed action in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, alleging
that the school district and several school officials had violated his First Amendment freedom of

369

Id.

370

Id. at 850.

371

Id.

372

Id.

373

Id.

74

speech rights when they disciplined him for his post.374 According to Reid, the post was neither
reasonably calculated to reach the school environment, nor had it presented a risk of substantial
disruption to the school environment.375 School officials argued that Reid’s Internet post was not
protected by the First Amendment because the post was obscene, caused substantial disruption,
and was lewd and offensive.376
In response to the claim that Reid’s Internet post had been obscene, the district court
applied a test developed in a 1973 Minnesota Supreme Court decision, Miller v. California.377 In
order for speech to be considered obscene under the Miller Test, it needed to meet three criteria:
a) the average person would find the speech appealed to the prurient interest; b) the speech
depicted or described, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct, and c) the speech lacked
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.378 Applying this test, the court found that
Reid’s speech had not met the test’s second prong because it was neither obscene nor patently
offensive.379
School officials had also argued they had a right to regulate Reid’s speech under Tinker’s
substantial disruption exception. Specifically, they claimed that because Reid’s post had
suggested a physical relationship between a teacher and a student, it was foreseeable the speech
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would reach the school environment and cause a substantial disruption.380 In response, the court
reasoned that the fact that Reid’s speech referenced sexual conduct between a teacher and a
student “[did] not, de facto, result in the post being likely to reach school and cause a substantial
disruption.”381 Further, the court noted, similar to the student speech at issue in both Layshock
and J.S. v. Blue Mountain, Reid’s speech caused no disruption to the school environment.382
Finally, school officials maintained they were authorized to regulate Reid’s post under
Fraser because it was lewd and constituted harassment of a teacher.383 The court, however,
observed that Fraser was “clearly limited to on-campus speech.”384 Even considering the Fourth
Circuit decision Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools,385 which found that school officials were
authorized to regulate speech that was directed at the school and created substantial disruption to
the school environment, the court found no evidence that Reid’s post directly targeted the
school.386
Ultimately, the court ruled in Reid’s favor, concluding that Reid’s post had not caused a
substantial disruption and was not lewd, obscene, vulgar, or harassing in nature. The court noted,
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“The law is sufficiently clear” in cases such as this one, stating that a student such as Reid
“would have a clearly established right to free speech.”387 The school district did not appeal.
Burge v. Colton School District 53388

In 2015, an Oregon federal district court ruled in a case involving a middle school student
and his Facebook posts. Braeden Burge was a 14 year-old eighth-grade student at Colton Middle
School.389 Braeden, who typically earned “As” in school, learned he had received a “C” from his
health teacher.390 As a consequence for receiving this low grade, Braeden’s mother grounded
him for a portion of the summer.391 To vent his frustration, Braeden posted several comments on
his private Facebook page from his own home while school was not in session. He posted that he
wanted to “start a petition to get mrs. [sic] Bouck fired, she’s the worst teacher ever.”392 After a
peer asked what the teacher had done, Braeden posted, “She’s just a bitch haha” and later “Ya
haha she needs to be shot.”393 According to Braeden’s deposition, he had not intended to threaten
his teacher, did not seriously believe she should be shot, and did not intend to start a petition to

387

Id. at 863.

388

Burge v. Colton, 100 F. Supp. 3d 1057 (D. Or. 2015).

389

Id. at 1065.

390

Id.

391

Id. at 1064.

392

Id. at 1060.

393

Id.

77

get her fired. Rather, his only purpose in posting the comments was to elicit a response from his
friends.394
Less than 24 hours after he posted his comments, Braeden’s mother viewed them. She
immediately instructed Braeden to remove the posts, and he did.395 Later, the parent of another
student anonymously placed a printout of Braeden’s Facebook post in the school principal’s
school mailbox.396 The principal brought Braeden to the school office to question him, and
Braeden acknowledged he had made the comments. The principal accused Braeden of violating
School Board policies and placed him on a three and a half day in-school suspension.397 The
principal then called Braeden’s mother, who informed the principal she was aware of the post
and had already talked to Braeden about it. Braeden’s mother told the principal she disagreed
with the school’s discipline decision, stating that her child could not be disciplined for
misconduct that had occurred outside of school.398 The principal continued with the suspension
despite Braeden’s mother’s opposition. Following the suspension, Braeden returned to classes to
complete the last week of eighth grade.399
Braeden’s family filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon,
alleging the principal had violated Braeden’s First Amendment right to free speech when she
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punished him for the Facebook posts.400 School officials argued that Braeden’s speech was not
protected by the First Amendment because it fell within the “true threat” exception and because
it presented an actual or potential material and substantial disruption of the school
environment.401
First addressing the “true threat” claim, the district court observed, “Not every off-hand
reference to violence is a true threat unprotected by the First Amendment.”402 The court pointed
out that it was undisputed that Braeden had not intended to threaten or intimidate anyone with his
posts; in fact, Braeden had not intended for his teacher to even view the posts, as they were
accessible only to his Facebook friends.403 The court applied an objective test to the “true threat”
claim, asking whether a reasonable person would foresee Braeden’s statement being interpreted
as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault his teacher.404 The court noted that because
neither Braeden’s mother nor school officials had conducted any investigations, contacted police
or mental health professionals, or removed Braeden from the teacher’s classroom, it was
apparent Braeden’s comments had not created any real concerns about potential violence.405
Given the benign nature of Braeden’s comments and his lack of intent to do harm, the court ruled
that the posts were not “true threats” under either a subjective or objective test.406
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Turning to the school’s substantial disruption claim, the court referenced two Ninth
Circuit cases addressing whether Tinker governed off-campus speech.407 The court found no
evidence indicating that Braeden’s Facebook posts had impacted classroom activity or that
school officials could have foreseen a potential for substantial disruption based on the posts. In
fact, during the six-week period before the principal became aware of the posts, no one had
talked about or otherwise acknowledged the posts.408 Finding no evidence that Braeden had a
history of violence or disciplinary issues or access to guns, the court found that no reasonable
fact-finder could conclude that Braeden’s posts had been reasonably likely to substantially
disrupt the school environment.409 The court declared, “Thus, even if Tinker applies to Braeden’s
off-campus speech, [school officials] violated Braeden’s First Amendment free speech rights
when [they] suspended him.”410 The school district did not appeal.
Bell v. Itawamba411

In 2015, the Fifth Circuit ruled on a case originating in Mississippi. During the 2010-11
school winter holiday break, Taylor Bell, an aspiring rap artist and senior at the Itawamba
Agricultural School in Mississippi, composed, sang, and recorded a rap song.412 He posted the
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song on both Facebook and YouTube.413 The rap song criticized two coaches, Coach Wildmon
and Coach Rainey, alleging both coaches had engaged in sexual misconduct toward female
students. The rap song contained vulgar language, including the phrases “looking down girls’
shirts/drool running down your mouth/messing with the wrong one/going to get a pistol down
your mouth” and “middle fingers up if you can’t stand that nigga/middle fingers up if you want
to cap that nigga.”414 Taylor’s song was made available to over 1,300 Facebook “friends” and an
unlimited audience on YouTube.
According to Taylor, several of his female student friends had told him that the coaches
had inappropriately touched them and had made sexually-charged comments to them and to
other female students at the school.415 Taylor later explained that his song was an effort to speak
out on the issue of teacher-on-student sexual harassment, noting he had not reported these
complaints to school officials because he believed that school officials generally ignored student
complaints.416
The day after the recording was posted, one of the coaches learned about the posting in a
text message from his wife, who had learned about it from a friend. The coach listened to the
recording on a student’s phone at school and immediately reported the rap song to the school’s
principal, who then informed the school district’s superintendent.417 The following day, Taylor
was taken out of class to meet with the principal, district superintendent, and school board
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attorney.418 During this meeting, school officials accused Taylor of making threats and false
allegations. Taylor denied making threats but admitted he had made allegations about the
coaches’ improper contact with female students. According to Taylor, he made these allegations
believing they were true.419 After the meeting, the principal drove Taylor to a friend’s house
rather than allowing him to attend his remaining classes for the day. On the next day school was
in session, the assistant principal told Taylor he was being suspended indefinitely pending a
hearing.420
The Itawamba County School Board’s Disciplinary Committee held a hearing on January
26, 2011, which Taylor attended with his mother and a private attorney. The Committee
concluded that Taylor’s rap song had constituted harassment, intimidation, and possible threats
against teachers.421 The Committee suspended Taylor for seven days and transferred him to an
alternative school for the remaining five weeks of the nine-week school period.422 On February
7, 2011, Taylor appealed the Disciplinary Committee’s findings and punishment at a hearing
before the school board. The school board upheld the punishment, affirming the Committee’s
finding that Taylor’s rap song had threatened, harassed, and intimidated school officials.423
A week later, Taylor’s mother, Dora Bell, filed a complaint on behalf of her son in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi. The lawsuit claimed that the
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punishment imposed upon Taylor violated his First Amendment right to free speech.424 In its
ruling, the district court agreed with both the Disciplinary Committee’s and Itawamba School
Board’s conclusion that the rap song had constituted harassment, intimidation, and possible
threats toward school officials.425 The court observed that the rap song had included charges of
serious sexual misconduct against two teachers, used vulgar and threatening language, was
published on Facebook and an unlimited Internet audience on YouTube.com, and would cause a
substantial disruption at school.426 Therefore, ruling that school officials had not erred in
punishing Taylor for publishing the song, the court dismissed Bell’s lawsuit.427
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit initially reversed the lower court’s decision, before affirming
it en banc a year later. In its first decision, the panel found that the district court’s application of
Tinker had been “legally incorrect”428 because posting the rap song would not have substantially
disrupted the discipline of the school even if Tinker had been applied. Further, the panel
concluded that Taylor’s rap song could not be regulated as a “true threat” under Watts.429
After an en banc rehearing of the case, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Tinker could, in
fact, be applied to Taylor’s rap song. According to the en banc panel, a rap song such as Taylor’s
that could be understood by school officials to threaten, harass, and intimidate a teacher should
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be subjected to a Tinker analysis.430 Having decided Tinker was the correct analytical tool, the en
banc panel reasoned that school officials could have forecast that the rap song’s publication
would cause a substantial disruption to the school environment. This conclusion was based upon
the panel’s observation that Taylor’s rap song had pertained to specific events occurring at the
school, identified the teachers by name, and was understood as being threatening.431 The panel
pointed out that threatening and intimidating a teacher impedes teachers’ ability to teach and
educate and disrupts the educational environment.432 The Fifth Circuit observed, “If there is to be
education, such conduct cannot be permitted.”433 Having determined the rap song could be
regulated under Tinker’s substantial disruption standard, the Fifth Circuit found no need to
decide whether the speech also constituted a “true threat” under Watts. In conclusion, the en
banc panel affirmed the district court’s decision, finding in favor of school officials.434
Four of the judges on the en banc panel wrote dissenting opinions. Three of the dissenters
questioned Tinker’s application to off-campus student speech, and one expressed hope that the
Supreme Court would soon provide guidance regarding how to resolve these challenging
disputes.435 In dissent, Judge Dennis argued that the majority had committed several fundamental
errors. According to Dennis, the ruling: 1) failed to acknowledge that Taylor’s rap song
constituted speech on a “matter of public concern” and therefore should be protected under the
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First Amendment; 2) drastically expanded the scope of school officials’ authority to regulate
students’ off-campus speech and minimized students’ First Amendment protection; and 3)
inappropriately applied the Tinker framework, which was far too broad a standard to adequately
protect the rights of students who engage in speech outside of school.436 He wrote, “The majority
opinion allows schools to police their students’ Internet expression anytime and anywhere- an
unprecedented and unnecessary intrusion on students’ rights.”437
In his dissent, Judge Dennis raised significant concerns about the majority opinion,
declaring that the majority had sent a message to Taylor and to all children that the First
Amendment does not protect students whose speech challenges those in power.438 He wrote,
“[the decision] undermines the rights of all students and adults to both speak and receive speech
on matters of public concern through the Internet.”439 Three other judges joined Judge Dennis in
questioning Tinker’s application to off-campus speech.440
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Id. In this comment, Judge Dennis referenced a Supreme Court case, Pickering v. Board of
Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). In Pickering, an Illinois public school teacher was dismissed by the
Board of Education for writing and sending a letter to a local newspaper in connection with a
recently proposed tax increase. The letter was critical of the way the Board and district
administration had handled past proposals to raise new revenue for the schools. District
administration dismissed the teacher after determining the letter’s publication was “detrimental to
the efficient operation and administration of the schools of the district.” (564). Reversing the
decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court held that “a teacher’s
exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his
dismissal from public employment.” (574).
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In November 2015, Bell appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court. The
question presented on appeal was “whether and to what extent public schools, consistent with the
First Amendment, may discipline students for their off-campus speech.”441 In the petition, Bell
argued that Tinker’s application to off-campus speech would have “particularly devastating
consequences” in light of students’ use of online social media. The petition further noted that
students risk “life-altering consequences” like suspension or expulsion any time they say
anything potentially controversial on a social media platform.442 The petition went on to argue
that Tinker should not apply to off-campus speech on matters of public concern.443
Further, the petition raised concerns about the “troubling racial overtones” communicated
by the Fifth Circuit’s decision.444 In punishing Taylor for his song, school officials targeted rap
music, a type of music often considered particularly relevant to African American youth. 445
Taylor’s rap contained violent rhetoric, as is common in rap music. School officials and the Fifth
Circuit agreed the lyrics would not necessarily qualify as “true threats” under Watts but
nevertheless constituted threats, harassment, and intimidation. According to the petition, this was
unacceptable. Taylor argued that his song was not threatening under any conceivable standard, as
evidenced by the fact the school officials had allowed Taylor to return to classes as usual after
learning about the song.446 Further, petitioners argued, by interpreting Taylor’s lyrics literally,
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the en banc majority had “ignore[d] settled First Amendment jurisprudence” and “pose[d] a
grave threat to artistic expression.”447 On February 29, 2016, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari.

447 Id.

at 31.

CHAPTER THREE
ANALYSIS

This chapter will provide an analysis of the cases reviewed in chapter two. The purpose
of this chapter is to analyze and identify trends in the case law. The areas to be discussed include
trends by region and level of court; trends by student age and gender; issues relating to student
race; electronic speech containing threats toward staff members; the application of Tinker,
Wisniewski, and Fraser; speech addressing matters of public concern; the disciplinary actions
imposed on students; school copyright law and acceptable use policies; and school officials’
initial response to student speech.
Trends by Region and Level of Court
While both state and federal constitutions have free speech provisions, litigation in the
area of student free speech has primarily taken place in federal courts. Of the thirteen cases
reviewed, twelve cases were decided in federal courts and one (J.S. v. Bethlehem) was decided
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The breakdown of decisions by region and level of court
is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Decisions by Circuit, Level of Court, and Outcome.
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An analysis of decisions by circuit indicates that, within each circuit, courts have ruled
consistently. That is, each circuit has ruled either 100% in favor of the student or 100% in favor
of the school. To date, students have been unsuccessful in litigation in the Second and Fifth
Circuits, while school officials have never prevailed in the Third, Eighth, Ninth, or Eleventh
Circuits. Geographically, while cases have spanned from the east to the west coast, the majority
of cases have occurred in either the country’s eastern or mid-western states.
Because of the small sample size of decisions, it is not possible to draw conclusions about
how courts across circuits may rule in future cases involving student electronic speech that
targets school employees. However, a descriptive statistical analysis suggests that, as would be
expected, courts may follow precedent within their own circuits. For example, school officials
may be more likely to prevail within the Second Circuit, whereas students may be more likely to
prevail in the Third and Eighth Circuits. That said, until more cases around this topic are brought
forward, it will be difficult to identify definitive patterns in decisions by region and level of
court.
Trends by Student Age and Gender

All of the student-plaintiffs in the cases reviewed were middle or high school students.
Specifically, a slight majority of the students were in high school (seven of thirteen), and the
majority were boys (eight of thirteen). Of the four cases where school officials prevailed, three of
the four students were boys (two in middle school/junior high school and one in high school),
and one was a girl (high school). In the decisions where students prevailed, five involved boys
(two middle school and three high school), and three involved girls (two middle school and one
high school).
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An analysis of demographic trends suggests that high school students, and boys in
particular, might be more likely to find themselves in legal disputes regarding student offcampus electronic speech that targets school employees. In addition, schools may be more likely
to prevail in cases involving disciplinary action toward boys, though this relationship is clearly
impacted by multiple variables.448
Student Race and Electronic Speech That Targets School Employees
The ability to analyze decisions by student race is limited, as the student-petitioner’s race
was only mentioned in one of the reviewed cases: Bell v. Itawamba. Then, even in Bell, neither
the majority opinion nor any of the dissenting opinions commented on the student’s race as a
factor in the decision. Bell’s petition brief to the Supreme Court was the first point in the legal
proceeding where this issue was addressed. Specifically, Bell’s petition argued that school
officials had targeted rap music, which was characterized as “an established form of artistic
expression of particular relevance to African American youth.”449 The petition further pointed
out that experts agreed Taylor Bell’s lyrics were “no more ‘threatening’ than any number of
critically acclaimed and commercially successful rap songs.”450 The petition stated, “Social
Namely, the rate of suspension and expulsion is higher for boys than for girls. According to the
National Center for Education Statistics, in 2012 25.7% of all males in grades 6-12 had ever been
suspended or expelled and 13.2% of all females had ever been suspended or expelled. See Digest of
Education Statistics, INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION SCIENCES (IES) NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION
STATISTICS, Table 233.20,
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_233.20.asp?current=yes (last visited Jan.
22, 2018). So, given this, more boys than girls would likely find themselves in a position to take
legal action against their school districts.
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justice organizations explain that the [Bell] decision… enables schools to censor off-campus
speech that officials dislike, and exacerbates a well-documented pattern of racially
disproportionate discipline.”451 Here, the petition seemed to imply that the Fifth Circuit’s
decision in favor of school officials perpetuated a history of discriminatory disciplinary practices
toward black youth.452
Though Bell was the first time a student’s race or ethnicity was raised as a contributing
factor in a student electronic speech decision, many might argue that this discussion was long
overdue. Data from 2012 indicates that almost one half of all black males in grades six through
twelve had been either suspended or expelled from school at least once.453 As such, the topic of
race is one that cannot and should not be ignored in any school discipline case. Though the
Supreme Court did not grant certiorari and therefore did not address this specific issue in Bell,
the fact that this issue was raised opens new doors for future cases. School officials and courts
should feel obliged to consider how a student’s race may be impacting the school district’s
reasoning as they decide when – and whose – student speech can be regulated.
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The pattern of racially disproportionate discipline to which this petition is referring is evident in
a review of suspension rates nation-wide from the National Center for Education Statistics. In 2012,
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Student Electronic Speech Containing Threats Against School Employees

As outlined in Chapter 2, in Watts v. United States454 the Supreme Court recognized an
exception to speech protected by the First Amendment, ruling that “true threats” are never
considered protected speech. However, the Court stopped short of proposing a test to help courts
determine when speech constitutes a true threat.455 In the absence of a test, lower courts have
varied in their interpretations of how a true threat is defined.456 This variation in whether and
how courts interpret Watts has been evidenced in student electronic speech cases. In fact, not
only have courts differed in their interpretations of what a true threat entails, but they have also
expressed varying perspectives about whether Watts is even applicable to student speech.
Watts and Student Speech That References Violence Toward School Employees

Of the student electronic speech cases reviewed in this study, four cases addressed speech
that referenced violence toward a staff member: J.S. v. Bethlehem, Wisniewksi v. Board of
Education, Burge v. Colton, and Bell v. Itawamba. Of these four cases, courts applied Watts in
Bethlehem and Burge. In both of these decisions, despite Bethlehem finding in favor of the
school district and Burge finding in favor of the student, the courts found that no true threat
existed. Specifically, though the Bethlehem court ruled that J.S.’s speech was punishable, they
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stopped short of finding J.S.’s speech to constitute a true threat. The court agreed that J.S.’s
speech was “a sophomoric, crude, highly offensive and perhaps misguided attempt at humor or
parody”457 but held the speech had not reflected a serious intent to inflict harm.458
Similarly, when an Oregon federal district court addressed a true threat claim in Burge,
the court ruled that no reasonable person would foresee the student’s statement being interpreted
as a serious intent to harm or assault.459 The court ruled that because the school district had not
conducted an investigation, contacted police or mental health professionals, nor removed the
student from the classroom as a result of the student’s speech, district officials must not have had
any real concerns about violence.460 In Burge the district court pointed out, “Not every off-hand
reference to violence is a true threat unprotected by the First Amendment.”461
The student speech in both Wisniewski and Bell also included some threatening language,
and in both cases the courts ruled in favor of the school district. Interestingly, however, neither
of these courts applied Watts. The Wisniewski court reasoned the Watts standard was not
appropriate for schools, finding that school officials have broader authority to regulate student
speech than the true threat standard allows.462 The opinion stated, “With respect to school
officials’ authority to discipline a student’s expression reasonably understood as urging violent
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content, we think the appropriate First Amendment standard is the one set forth by the Supreme
Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.”463 Thus, the Wisniewski
court held that Watts was inapplicable not just to the case at hand, but to any situations involving
student speech in public schools.
In Bell, the Fifth Circuit seemed somewhat divided about the true threat issue. In its first
decision, in favor of the student, the panel found that Bell’s speech could not be characterized as
a “true threat” under Watts.464 A year later, when an en banc panel ruled in favor of the school
district, the panel made several references to Bell’s threatening language but avoided a “true
threat” analysis. The en banc panel determined that it was, in part, the threatening nature of
Bell’s speech that led to a substantial disruption in school.465
It is interesting to consider whether the Bell outcome would have been different had
Watts been applied. Indeed, had the Appellate Court performed a true threat analysis, the court
would likely have found Bell’s speech to be protected.466 Bell denied making threats in his
lyrics,467 and his lyrics were not taken seriously by anyone within the school.468 In petitioning for
Supreme Court review, Bell commented on these apparent contradictions. Petitioners noted that
the Fifth Circuit had agreed that the speech did not qualify as a true threat but nevertheless
463
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punished Bell for engaging in threatening speech. The reply brief stated, “[t]his Court has never
recognized a category of unprotected speech for ‘threatening’ rap lyrics that are not a threat.”469
Watts and Student Speech With No Threats or References to Violence
Only one court applied Watts in the absence of violent or threatening student speech. In
R.S. v. Minnewaska,470 a Minnesota federal district court applied Watts to a student’s Facebook
postings that had expressed the student’s dislike of a school hall monitor. Not surprisingly, the
court found that the postings did not constitute true threats.471 The fact that the R.S. court applied
Watts along with Tinker and Fraser suggests that this particular court perceived Watts to be
applicable to student speech. In fact, the opinion asserted, “[Student statements made offcampus] are protected under the First Amendment and not punishable by school authorities
unless they are true threats or are reasonably calculated to reach the school environment and are
so egregious as to pose a serious safety risk or other substantial disruption in that
environment.”472
Conclusions: Watts and Student Electronic Speech

Ultimately, while courts appear mixed in their opinions as to whether Watts applies to
student speech, the spirit of the Watts standard seems relevant to decisions involving threatening
student electronic speech. In fact, regardless of the courts’ perspective on the applicability of
469
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Watts, it is notable that the school district won in three of the four cases where student speech
included a reference of violence toward a staff member.473
This statistic might not be as noteworthy if school districts had prevailed more frequently.
However, school officials prevailed in only five of the thirteen student electronic speech cases
reviewed.474 In three of these five, the student speech included references to violence toward a
staff member. In fact, given that the fourth and fifth cases (both Doninger decisions) involved
some facts that distinguished it from the other cases,475 the trend of courts ruling in favor of
school districts in cases of threatening student language becomes even more significant.
Taken altogether, it seems that courts do tend to agree on one issue: Student speech that
poses a potential threat toward a school official can be regulated. Even though Watts can take
very little, if any, credit for these school district victories in court, it is nevertheless undeniable
that courts tend to side with school districts when faced with student speech that threatens school
officials.
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494 F.3d 34 (2nd. Cir. 2007); Burge v. Colton, 100 F. Supp. 3d 1057 (D. Or. 2015); and Bell v.
Itawamba, 779 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015). The school district won in Bethlehem, Wisniewski, and Bell.
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Notably, the student in Doninger was not suspended or expelled as a result of her speech, as
were most of the students in the other cases. In Doninger, the disciplinary action involved the
student being prohibited from running for student government. In its opinion, the Doninger court
acknowledged that its ruling might have been different had school officials imposed a more serious
disciplinary action.
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Tinker: Approaching a Tipping Point
Despite having been decided in 1969, Tinker remains the foundational case for judicial
analysis of First Amendment student speech issues. Tinker was the first time the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled on a case involving student freedom of speech within the school environment, and it
is among the most well-known and frequently referenced legal cases involving students.
Interestingly, despite its popularity, some scholars have raised concerns about the judiciary’s
continued reliance upon Tinker.476 These concerns have been evidenced by lower courts’
reticence to apply Tinker’s second prong477 and, perhaps more importantly, lower courts’
tendency to defer to school officials in student speech cases.478 Specifically, although Justice
Black’s dissent did not garner wide attention at the time Tinker was decided, the dissent has
steadily been accorded growing support. In fact, in the almost five decades since Tinker, courts’
student speech decisions have moved closer in line with Justice Black’s dissent than with the
majority opinion.479

See, e.g., Perry Zirkel, The Rocket’s Red Glare: The Largely Errant and Deflected Flight of Tinker, 38
J.L. & EDUC. 593 (2009). Zirkel argues that the impact of Tinker on students’ rights case law has been
“more symbolic rather than substantial.” Id. at 602.
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Tinker and Substantial Disruption Caused by Student Electronic Speech
Tinker’s significance remains relevant to student electronic speech as well, though its
applicability has recently come into question. All thirteen of the decisions reviewed in this study
referenced and/or applied Tinker or the “substantial disruption” test. However, some of these
decisions raised questions regarding Tinker’s relevance.
In each of the five cases where school districts prevailed,480 courts applied Tinker and
determined that the student’s speech had indeed caused – or was likely to cause – substantial
disruption to the school environment. Interestingly, the court concluded that a substantial
disruption had in fact occurred in only one of these decisions: J.S. v. Bethlehem. In J.S., the court
reasoned that the physical and emotional impact Mrs. Fulmer experienced, together with the
“demoralizing impact on the school community” that occurred as a result of J.S.’s speech,
constituted a substantial disruption to the school environment.481 With this ruling, the court set
the bar high for what was considered a “substantial” disruption.
In contrast, courts in the other four decisions where schools prevailed - the Second
Circuit in Wisniewski, Doninger I, and Doninger II and the Fifth Circuit in Bell - seemed to rely
on different interpretations of Tinker. In Wisniewski, the Second Circuit built upon Tinker to
formulate a new test, the application of which will be analyzed in a subsequent section of this
Chapter. In the Doninger decisions, the Second Circuit applied this new test, along with Tinker,
to the student’s speech. In both Doninger decisions the court concluded that the speech had
See J.S. v. Bethlehem, 757 A.2d 412 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002; Wisniewski v. Board of Education, 494
F.3d 34 (2nd. Cir. 2007); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2nd Cir. 2008); Doninger v. Niehoff, 642
F.3d 334 (2nd. Cir. 2011). and Bell v. Itawamba, 779 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015).
480
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created a risk of substantial disruption within the school because it undermined the values
student government was designed to promote.482 In should be noted that, in this case, the
substantial disruption identified seemed more subjective than was the case in J.S. That is, it
seems easier to find a connection between a student’s speech and a teacher’s leave of absence
than between a student’s speech and the undermining of values within a student government
organization. Nevertheless, the school districts prevailed in each of these cases.
Disciplinary Consequences and The Application of Tinker
Another interesting element of the Doninger decisions is the Second Circuit panel’s
implication that the disciplinary consequence the student received (i.e., disqualification from
student government) played a factor in the court’s ruling. Specifically, the court pointed out that
the outcome may have been different had school officials imposed a more serious consequence
than disqualification from student office.483 This acknowledgement suggested that Tinker’s
application might not always be as straightforward as some courts might prefer it to be. Had the
student been suspended or given a more serious consequence than disqualification from student
office, the Second Circuit may have ruled differently. Under different circumstances (had, for
example, the student’s property interest in education been impacted by a suspension or
expulsion), the court may have applied the test more strictly in light of the impacted property
rights. In this case, the court may have determined no substantial disruption occurred and thereby
ruled in favor of the student.

482Doninger,
483

527 F.3d at 52 and Doninger, 642 F.3d at 350-351.

Doninger, 527 F.3d at 53.
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Tinker in Bell: Most Questionable Application to Date
The Fifth Circuit in Bell did not reference any disruption caused by Taylor Bell’s rap
song. However, the panel nevertheless found Taylor’s speech punishable under Tinker,
determining school officials could have forecast that the rap song’s publication would have
caused a substantial disruption to the school environment due to its threatening language.484
Interestingly, three of the four dissenting opinions in Bell questioned Tinker’s application to offcampus student speech. In one dissenting opinion, Judge Dennis not only questioned the
applicability of Tinker to off-campus speech in general but also argued that Tinker had been
incorrectly applied to Taylor’s speech.485 According to Judge Dennis, the summary-judgment
evidence simply did not support a conclusion that Taylor’s song had substantially disrupted
school activities or that school officials could have forecasted it would do so. “In reaching the
opposite conclusion,” Judge Dennis argued, “the majority opinion . . . dilute[d] the Tinker
‘substantial disruption’ framework into an analytic nullity.”486 In the fourth dissenting opinion, in
an effort to address the blurred lines between on- and off-campus speech, Judge Graves proposed
a modified Tinker standard for off-campus speech.487
Tinker’s applicability to off-campus speech was further questioned in Bell’s petition to
the Supreme Court. In a writ for certiorari, Bell argued that applying Tinker to off-campus
speech would have “devastating consequences” in light of students’ use of online social
484
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media.488 In the petition, Bell also argued that the Fifth Circuit’s finding conflicted with the
Third Circuit’s en banc decisions in J.S. v. Blue Mountain and Layshock v. Hermitage.
Specifically, the petition argued that Taylor would have prevailed under the Third Circuit’s
analysis of case law. The court held in J.S. that school officials could not forecast a disruption
from speech that was neither spoken nor heard on campus, and Taylor’s speech was not heard on
school grounds other than when a coach ordered a student to play it.489

The Wisniewski Application of Tinker: Little Traction to Date
Of the five decisions where the school district prevailed under Tinker, three relied on the
Wisniewski court’s application of Tinker. In these decisions, Wisniewski and Doninger I and II,
courts determined that the student speech at issue could be regulated under Tinker because it was
foreseeable the speech would make its way on campus and cause a substantial disruption in
school.
Wisniewski presented a new avenue for school officials to prevail in cases where student
electronic speech targeted school employees. According to the Wisniewski test, students could be
disciplined for off-campus speech that included violent content where (1) there was a reasonably
foreseeable risk the speech would come to the attention of school officials, and (2) there was a
reasonably foreseeable risk the speech would materially and substantially disrupt the discipline
of the school.490
488
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In the Doninger decisions, the Second Circuit relied on the Wisniewski application of
Tinker. Applying Wisniewski in Doninger I and II, the appellate panels determined that Avery’s
blog post would likely reach the school and cause substantial disruption. The Second Circuit
made this determination due to the fact that the blog post contained offensive language as well as
misleading or false information. Ultimately, the court found that Avery’s speech was disruptive
to school officials’ efforts to work with student council members and that it complicated school
government activities by undermining the student council’s values.491
In contrast, the Third Circuit has shown limited interest in Wisniewski. In fact, the
Wisniewski decision was not referenced at all in the J.S. v. Blue Mountain opinion,492 and the
Layshock court only briefly mentioned (but did not apply) Wisniewski in its majority opinion.
Interestingly, the Third Circuit attempted to differentiate Doninger’s blog post and the website in
J.S. v. Blue Mountain through a discussion of the student’s intent.493 The Doninger panel noted
that Avery Doninger had emailed others and invited them to contact school officials, whereas
J.S. had made her MySpace profile private.494 In Doninger, the Third Circuit panel implied that a
speaker must have intended for the speech to reach campus in order for it to be regulated under
Tinker or Wisniewski.495 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Bell referenced Wisniewski only to justify
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its application of Tinker.496 Though the Fifth Circuit panel could have applied the Wisniewski test
given the facts of the case (specifically, because Taylor’s speech contained violent content), the
court relied upon a traditional Tinker analysis instead.
Ultimately, Wisniewski has not gained much traction beyond the Second Circuit with
regard to cases involving student off-campus electronic speech targeting school employees. This
could be due to Wisniewski’s potential for allowing school officials to discipline students for
nearly any electronic speech of which they did not approve. Nowadays almost all communication
created online can make its way to a school campus and to the attention of school authorities.497
As one legal scholar noted, “A bare foreseeability standard would encompass virtually all offcampus speech and would leave very little First Amendment protection for students.”498 Until the
Third Circuit is challenged with another student off-campus electronic speech case that targets
school employees and involves violent content, courts will likely continue to rely on the original
Tinker test rather than on the Wisniewski application of Tinker.
Tinker in Off-Campus Electronic Speech: An Uncertain Future

Ultimately, though Tinker was referenced and/or applied in each case reviewed, the
controversies evident in the most recent relevant decision, Bell v. Itawamba, suggest that lower
courts are beginning to question Tinker’s application to off-campus speech. The lower courts
may be reaching a tipping point, where only the Supreme Court can provide guidance regarding
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if and to what extent Tinker applies to student off-campus electronic speech. As students’ use of
online social media continues to grow, these questions will likely continue to challenge the
courts’ reliance on this foundational Supreme Court decision.
Fraser and Student Electronic Speech That Targets School Officials

The consensus of almost all cases reviewed is that Fraser is specific to on-campus
speech. In fact, several courts implied or specifically stated that Fraser was not applicable to the
off-campus speech at hand,499 and others acknowledged that its applicability was unclear.500 Still,
other courts refrained from any mention of Fraser in their opinions at all.501
Only two courts applied Fraser to the off-campus electronic speech at issue: the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in J.S. v. Bethlehem and the Fifth Circuit in Bell v. Itawamba. In
J.S. v. Bethlehem, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined J.S.’s speech met the Fraser
framework because the speech was viewed on campus.502 Interestingly, other courts did not
apply Fraser in this way, despite the student speech having been viewed on campus. The Fifth
Circuit did not apply Fraser in Bell, but this decision was not based upon a conclusion that

See Killion v. Franklin, 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001); Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365,
(S.D. Fla. 2010); J.S. v. Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d 915 (3rd Cir. 2011); Layshock v. Hermitage, 650 F.3d
205 (3rd Cir. 2011); Sagehorn v. Independent, 122 F. Supp. 3d 842 (D. Minn. 2015); and Burge v.
Colton, 100 F. Supp. 3d 1057 (D. Or. 2015).
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Fraser was inapplicable to off-campus speech.503 Rather, the panel reasoned, Fraser was not “on
point” because school officials had not suspended Bell due to the lewdness of his speech.504 In
this decision, the Fifth Circuit implied that Fraser could potentially be applied to student offcampus electronic speech.
In conclusion, to date, no federal court has relied upon Fraser to limit student off-campus
electronic speech that has targeted school officials. On the contrary, most courts have been
explicit in concluding that Fraser is specific to on-campus speech. For example, in Evans, the
Florida district court explained, “For a court to equate a school assembly to the Internet would
set a precedent far too reaching.”505 However, given the Second Circuit’s avoidance of the issue
in the Doninger decisions and the Fifth Circuit’s implication that Fraser might have applied
under slightly different circumstances in Bell, the question of Fraser’s applicability to offcampus speech might not have been completely laid to rest.
Matters of Public Concern
In the most recent case reviewed, Bell v. Itawamba, the student’s speech at issue
expressed concern about staff members allegedly having engaged in inappropriate conduct
toward students. The student testified that he believed these accusations were true and explained
that his speech was an effort to speak out about the issue.506 After the Fifth Circuit held that
school officials did not violate the student’s freedom of speech rights by disciplining him, one of
503
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the appellate judges in a dissenting opinion (like Taylor Bell’s mother in her petition to the
United States Supreme Court) argued that the student’s speech should be protected speech
because it addressed a matter of public concern.507 The judge wrote, “[the decision] undermines
the rights of all students and adults to both speak and receive speech on matters of public
concern through the Internet.”508 In this argument, the judge alluded to the United States
Supreme Court’s Pickering v. Board of Education decision, where the Court held that a public
school Board of Education could not dismiss a teacher for speaking on issues of public
importance.509 Bell’s dissenting opinion and petition to the Supreme Court posed an interesting
question that had not yet been explored in a case involving student off-campus electronic speech.
That question was whether student speech that contained information of “public importance”
should be treated as protected speech.
On a daily basis, school administrators and local boards of education are responsible for
balancing the safety and wellbeing of all students against individual free speech rights. With Bell
having elevated this question on a national level, school officials and courts will have another
factor to consider when making decisions about student speech. As students increasingly find
their voices online and inevitably speak out about issues that matter to them, school officials will
likely find themselves grappling with this balance.
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Disciplinary Actions Imposed
In the majority of the cases reviewed, school officials imposed suspension and/or
expulsion as disciplinary consequences in response to student electronic speech that targeted
school employees. The lengths of these suspensions or expulsions varied significantly. For
example, in Wisniewski, the student received a semester-long suspension.510 Most students in the
cases reviewed were penalized with ten-day suspensions (Killion, Buessink, Blue Mountain,
Layshock, and Sagehorn), some of which included or led to other significant consequences. For
example, the student in Buessink failed all of his classes as a result of the school district’s policy
on unexcused absences, which included days of suspension.511 In addition, the student in
Layshock was placed in the Alternative Education Program for the remainder of the year,
excluded from participation in extracurricular activities, and excluded from participation in the
graduation ceremony.512 The disciplinary action in Sagehorn v. Independent was significant, as
well. The student in this case was first issued a five-day suspension, which was then extended
another five days.513 In addition, the school district considered expelling the student, which
would likely have resulted in a university withdrawing the student’s early acceptance. Given the
significant consequences of a potential expulsion, the student’s parents decided to withdraw him
from school.514
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Some cases involved suspensions of fewer than ten days (Bethlehem, Evans, Burge, and
Bell), although some of these shorter suspensions also involved additional, perhaps more
significant, consequences. For example, though the student in Evans v. Bayer was suspended for
just three days, she was also transferred from AP-level to regular-level courses.515 Similarly, the
student in Bell was suspended for seven days but was then transferred to an alternative school for
the remaining five weeks of the nine-week school period.516
The one disciplinary consequence that did not involve either a suspension and/or an
expulsion occurred in the Doninger cases. In response to the student’s conduct in Doninger,
school officials disqualified the student from running for student government office. Admittedly,
in Doninger’s case, this comparatively benign disciplinary action may have had a significant
impact on the Second Circuit’s decision to rule in favor of the school.517 Interestingly, Doninger
I was the only opinion reviewed that mentioned the disciplinary action imposed as a factor in the
court’s reasoning and ultimate decision. Ultimately, this finding suggests that courts may be
more likely to defer to school officials in cases where the disciplinary actions imposed do not
infringe upon a student’s property right to education (i.e., do not involve suspension or
expulsion).
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School Policies: Copyright Law and Acceptable Use

Of the cases reviewed, two majority opinions involved either the use of a school district
owned computer or a violation of copyright law. In J.S. v. Blue Mountain, school officials
claimed that the student’s use of a school district photograph in her MySpace profile violated
both copyright law and the school district’s computer use policy.518 Similarly, in Layshock v.
Hermitage, school officials contended that the student’s creation of a MySpace profile amounted
to a computer policy violation, as the student had used school pictures without authorization.519
Interestingly, in both of these decisions the student ultimately prevailed. This finding
suggests school district policies around copyright law and acceptable computer use may not
completely protect school officials who attempt to regulate student off-campus speech. However,
as technology becomes more prevalent in schools and school districts develop and modify their
policies around acceptable technology use, this issue will likely begin to surface more frequently
in cases involving student electronic speech.

School Officials’ Initial Response to Student Speech
In most of the cases reviewed, school officials made the decision to discipline the student
immediately or shortly after becoming aware of the student’s speech. In a few cases, however,
school officials delayed the imposition of disciplinary consequences for various reasons. For
example, in Bell, the principal drove the student to a friend’s house and then suspended him the
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following day.520 In Doninger, school officials delayed notifying the student she would be unable
to run for student government office due to Advanced Placement (A.P.) testing being conducted
at the time of the incident.521 In J.S. v. Bethlehem, school officials sent the student a notice of
suspension several weeks after the incident, when the school year had concluded for summer
recess.522
In a couple cases, in response to a perceived threat, school officials involved either local
or federal law enforcement officials in the investigation. In Wisniewski v. Board of Education,
school officials contacted the local police,523 and in J.S. v. Bethlehem both the local police and
F.B.I were contacted.524 School officials prevailed in both cases where law enforcement was
involved, as well as in Bell. In all three of these cases, school officials had reportedly found the
student’s speech threatening.
Interestingly, some judges took note of school officials’ initial responses to the student
speech at hand. In a dissenting opinion to the first Bethlehem decision, a judge argued that school
officials’ initial response to the student’s speech suggested that school officials had not actually
perceived the speech to be a true threat.525 Specifically, the judge pointed out, school officials
had not taken any action to have the student removed from school, had not investigated whether
the threats were true, never separated the student from faculty or other students, and had not
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warned faculty that the student posed a possible threat.526 In addition, the judge pointed out that
the school officials’ delay in suspending the student suggested that they had not perceived the
student’s speech to be truly threatening.527
In a similar vein, in Bell v. Itawamba, both a dissenting opinion528 and the petition for
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court529 raised an issue over school officials’ immediate
response to a perceived threat. Both Bell and the judges authoring the dissenting opinion argued
that school officials must not have truly perceived the student’s rap song to be threatening
because they did not separate him from other students or take any other action to prevent
potential violence.
Interestingly, this apparent mismatch between threat perception and the response to a
threatening situation did not seem to matter in the end. In both Bethlehem and Bell, school
officials prevailed. Neither final decision determined the application of Watts true threat analysis
was appropriate, but instead utilized different analytical tools. Had the courts found Watts to be
applicable in both Bell and J.S. v. Bethlehem, they would likely have been forced to confront
these apparent contradictions between school officials’ initial response and school officials’ basis
for suspending the student.
In conclusion, of the cases reviewed, there does not appear to be a strong relationship
between school officials’ initial response to controversial student speech that targets a school
employee and the court’s ultimate ruling. School officials have responded to student speech in
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various ways, and the courts have not seemed to take issue with any of these responses. Though
some individual judges have questioned some school officials’ initial responses, particularly in
cases where school officials indicated they found the student’s speech to be threatening, this
questioning has not led to a different outcome for the student.

CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Student Speech in Public Schools: 1969 to 2017

The U.S. Constitution and public school officials have at least one common interest:
protecting the rights of individuals. Children who live and attend public schools within the
United States are protected by the Constitution whether they are inside or outside of a public
school building. Perhaps the Tinker majority said it best when the Court wrote, “It can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”530
However, two decades after the Tinker decision, the U.S. Supreme Court began giving
public school officials more authority to regulate student speech. The Fraser, Hazelwood, and
Morse decisions delineated the parameters within which school officials could regulate student
speech that: was lewd or obscene,531 was published as part of a school-sponsored newspaper,532
or promoted illegal drug use.533 As a result, the relationship between the U.S. Constitution and
public school officials began to evolve.
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When Tinker was decided in 1969, the Internet – not to mention Facebook and Instagram
– had not even been invented. Fast-forward to 2018, where a vast amount of communication
occurs on a minute-by-minute basis via the Internet and social media sites. Not surprisingly,
recent data demonstrates that student use of social media is on the rise.534 As children and adults
become more interested in and informed about social media, the potential consequences of
children’s online behaviors become greater. Student behavior on social media has implications
for students themselves, for individuals who are the targets of student electronic speech, and for
the public schools these students attend.535
To date, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of student electronic
speech that targets school employees. Despite five requests to review decisions from the
Second,536 Third,537 and Fifth Circuits,538 the High Court has denied certiorari in each case.
Amanda Lenhart, Teens, Social Media & Technology Overview 2015, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Apr. 9,
2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/teens-social-media-technology-2015/.
534

In fact, student electronic speech can even have implications for students’ college admissions.
For example, in 2017, Harvard College rescinded admissions offers to at least ten prospective
members of the Class of 2021 after becoming aware that the students had created a private
Facebook group chat, where they had sent each other memes and other images. Some of these
memes mocked sexual assault, the Holocaust, and the deaths of children. Others joked that abusing
children was sexually arousing or had punchlines targeting specific racial groups. See Natanson, H.
June 5, 2017. Harvard rescinds acceptances for at least ten students for obscence memes. THE
HARVARD CRIMSON (June 5, 2017), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2017/6/5/2021-offersrescinded-memes/.
535

See Wisniewski v. Board of Education, 494 F.3d 34 (2nd. Cir. 2007) and Doninger v. Niehoff, 527
F.3d 41 (2nd. Cir. 2008).
536

See J.S. v. Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d 915 (3rd Cir. 2011) and Layshock v. Hermitage, 650 F.3d 205
(3rd Cir. 2011).
537

538

See Bell v. Itawamba, 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015).

115

These denials have left lower courts to determine to what extent the Supreme Court’s earlier
rulings on public student speech – namely Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse – apply to
student electronic speech. As evidenced by this study’s literature review, lower courts have
responded to this challenge with often contradictory and inconsistent approaches. In fact, courts
have begun to disagree over Tinker’s application to student electronic speech that was created off
campus. Now, one short year shy of Tinker’s 50-year anniversary (but light years ahead of where
we were with technology just 10 years ago), it is time to re-examine the relationship between the
United States Constitution and student speech in public schools.539
So, What Does This Mean For Public School Officials?

School administrators are often called upon to make difficult and complex decisions
within a short amount of time. With student use of social media increasing so rapidly, school
officials often find themselves needing to respond, almost instantaneously, to controversial
student electronic speech. Undoubtedly, this challenge will only become increasingly complex as
technology advances. Gone are the days when it was clear where and how a student accessed the

In response to the Supreme Court’s decisions not to rule on this issue after Wisniewski, Doninger,
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REV. 709 (2012); Nancy Willard, M.S., J.D., Article: Student Online Off-Campus Speech: Assessing
“Substantial Disruption, 22 ALB. L. J. SCI. & TECH 611 (2012); Aaron J. Hersh, Note: Rehabilitating
Tinker: A Modest Proposal to Protect Public-School Students’ First Amendment Free Expression Rights
in the Digital Age, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1309 (2013); Daniel Marcus-Toll, Note: Tinker Gone Viral:
Diverging Threshold Tests for Analyzing School Regulation of Off-Campus Digital Student Speech, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 3395 (2014); and Elizabeth A. Shaver, Article: Denying Certiorari in Bell v.
Itawamba County School Board: A Missed Opportunity to Clarify Students’ First Amendment Rights in
the Digital Age, 82 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1539 (2017).
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Internet. Now, the second a student steps onto campus with an iPhone or Apple Watch, the
student’s Facebook post or Twitter tweet instantly becomes “on campus” as well. In addition,
with more and more schools adopting 1:1 Chromebook or iPad policies, students’ increased
access to social media will further complicate the issue of where, when, and how students may
create or access electronic speech.
Until the Supreme Court definitively addresses the topic of student off-campus electronic
speech that targets school employees, both lower courts and school officials will continue to be
called upon to navigate these situations on their own. Clearly, school officials would benefit
from judicial guidance designed to assist them in maintaining safe learning environments for all
students and staff while at the same time honoring individual students’ rights to freedom of
speech and expression. Until more definitive judicial guidance is provided, school officials
should focus on the development, communication, and implementation of both school-wide
prevention efforts and a protocol for responding to student cyberbullying.
Recommendations for School Administrators:
Prevention is the Best Intervention
On average, students spend more than six hours in school per day and attend school for
180 or more days each year.540 With so much of a student’s time spent within the walls of the
school, it is not surprising that what happens in school plays a role in shaping a young person’s
attitudes, mindsets, and behaviors. For this reason, school officials must be both thoughtful and
intentional in their efforts related to student cyberbullying that targets staff. In order to foster

Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION SERVICES (IES) NATIONAL CENTER FOR
EDUCATION STATISTICS, https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=49 (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
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pro-social and healthy communication, school officials must focus on building and maintaining a
positive school climate and teaching students pro-social behaviors.

Develop and Promote a Positive School Climate That Includes Healthy Channels of
Communication Between Students and Staff
A large body of research demonstrates the many benefits of a positive school climate.541
Specifically, healthy school climates are correlated with positive academic and social outcomes
for students, including a decreased likelihood of aggression and bullying.542 Though research on
cyberbullying is in its early stages, preliminary findings suggest a link between school climate
and cyberbullying. In a study conducted by the Cyberbullying Research Center, in schools where
students reported higher quality school climates, fewer students reported experiencing
cyberbullying either as a victim or as a bully.543
In some of the judicial decisions reviewed in this study, students reported having initially
created their electronic speech due to a concern or frustration about something that had happened
within the school community.544 The most recent and perhaps most significant example of this

Amrit Thapa, Jonathan Cohen, Shawn Guffey, Ann Higgins-D’Alessandro, A Review of School
Climate Research, 83, REVIEW OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH, 357-385 (2013).
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School Climate and Cyberbullying: An Empirical Link, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CENTER (2012),
https://cyberbullying.org/school-climate-and-cyberbullying-an-empirical-link (last visited Nov. 19,
2017).
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For example, in Killion, the student created a “Top Ten” list because he was apparently angered
after hearing about rules being imposed on members of the track team, and in Doninger, the student
was upset about an event being rescheduled and attempted to solicit the community’s help in
persuading school officials to let the event occur as scheduled.
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type of student experience occurred in Bell v. Itawamba. In Bell, some of the petitioner’s female
friends told him that some of the high school’s coaches were sexually harassing them. Believing
that school officials generally ignored student complaints, the student wrote a rap song in an
effort to speak out about the alleged sexual harassment.545 Thereafter, Taylor Bell was suspended
and transferred to an alternative school as a consequence of having composed and posted the rap
song on the Internet. In Bell, although school officials technically prevailed in the legal
proceedings, one could argue that neither the student nor the school community ultimately won.
The student’s message was likely overshadowed by the disciplinary actions and legal
proceedings, and students could have interpreted the school officials’ response to the speech as a
message that students should not weigh in on important issues. Had the student believed that
school officials would have genuinely listened to him, considered his concerns, and investigated
his allegations, perhaps he would not have utilized the Internet as the forum to communicate his
concerns.
Thus, in order to reduce the likelihood of cyberbullying toward school staff, school
officials must foster an environment where students genuinely feel that their individual and
collective voices are being heard. In addition, students must be engaged in the school process
and in decision-making within their school community.546 Some strategies to help build a voice
for students and staff include creating a Principal’s Advisory Council, encouraging dialogue
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Bell v. Itawamba, 779 F.3d 379, 410 (5th Cir. 2015).

Peter DeWitt, 5 Ways to Foster a Positive School Climate, EDUCATION WEEK BLOGS (2016),
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/finding_common_ground/2016/06/5_ways_to_foster_a_positive_
school_climate.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2017).
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rather than monologue, co-constructing student goals with students, and using results of student
climate surveys to make changes within the school.547
Finally, in considering how to develop a positive school climate in an effort to prevent
cyberbullying, school administrators should also remember that elements of students’ identities,
such as race and ethnicity, might impact students’ perceptions of school climate.548 For example,
a meta-analysis about school climate found that students of some racial subgroups reported
teacher-child relations to be the most important dimension of school climate, while other groups
emphasized teacher dispositions and behaviors such as fairness and caring.549 In order for school
leaders to improve school climate for all students, then, the authors indicated that school leaders
must “[have] the most complete understanding possible of what a positive school climate would
look and feel like for students who identify as belonging to specific races, ethnicities, or
cultures.”550
It is important to consider that the student in Bell reported believing that school
officials would ignore any report of teacher misconduct.551 According to Bell’s petition to the
Supreme Court, it appeared that Bell was right; at the time of writing the petition, the Board of
Education never denied the validity of Bell’s accusations, “[y]et no ‘responsible adult’ ha[d] ever
done anything to acknowledge them.”552 The petition challenged the High Court to consider the
547
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Bell v. Itawamba, 799 F3d 379, 410 (5th Cir. 2015).
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Brief for the Petitioner at 9, Bell v. Itawamba, 799 F.3d 379, (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-666).
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“troubling racial overtones” of the case, implying that Bell might have been treated unfairly due
to his race.553 Thus, in developing a positive school climate wherein all students feel a sense of
belonging, feel heard, and feel respected by school staff, school officials need to consider how a
student’s race, ethnicity, or even gender, gender identity, or sexual orientation may be impacting
both the student’s perception of their school as well as the school employees’ responses to the
student.

Teach Students Pro-Social Interpersonal Skills and Digital Citizenship

In addition to focusing on school climate and communication to prevent cyberbullying,
school officials should also consider incorporating social-emotional learning into their curricula.
According to CASEL, the Collaborative for Academic, Social, and Emotional Learning, social
and emotional learning (SEL) involves the process of learning and applying various knowledge,
attitudes, and skills that allow one to “[m]anage emotions, set and achieve positive goals, feel
and show empathy for others, establish and maintain positive relationships, and make responsible
decisions.”554 A 2011 meta-analysis showed that an intentional focus on building social and
emotional skills in students led to academic gains, improved classroom behavior, increased
student ability to manage depression and stress, and better student attitudes about themselves,
others, and school.555 Had the students in the reviewed cases learned and practiced pro-social
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What is SEL? COLLABORATIVE FOR ACADEMIC, SOCIAL, AND EMOTIONAL LEARNING (CASEL),
http://www.casel.org/what-is-sel/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
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ways of communicating their concerns about school-related issues, perhaps they may have
utilized different channels or different language in expressing themselves. In considering ways to
prevent student cyberbullying, school officials would be wise to refer to several websites and
organizations556 that offer programs, tools, and strategies to guide school officials in building
their social-emotional curriculum for students of all ages.
Not only do students need to learn how to interact productively and respectfully, they
also need to learn about communication and problem solving in a whole new dimension: the
Internet. That is, students need to develop what Common Sense Media557 calls “digital
citizenship.” Educator Vicki Davis offers “9 Key Ps” of digital citizenship.558 Davis suggests that
curriculum around digital citizenship include information about the following: 1) Passwords
(knowing how to create a secure password, developing a system for remembering passwords,
etc); 2) Privacy (knowing how to protect private information); 3) Personal Information (choosing
with whom to share personal information); 4) Photographs (developing awareness that some
private things may show up in photographs, knowing how to turn off geo-tagging, understanding

school-based universal interventions, 82, CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 405-432 (2011). As summarized on
CASEL website, http://www.casel.org/impact/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
Some of these organizations include the Collaborative for Academic, Social, and Emotional
Learning (CASEL), the Center for Great Teachers and Leaders, and Safe and Civil Schools.
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According to its website, Common Sense Media is the leading nonprofit organization dedicated
to helping kids thrive in a world of media and technology. The organization provides parents,
teachers, and policymakers with information, advice, and tools to help them utilize media and
technology positively and productively. See https://www.commonsensemedia.org/about-us/ourmission (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
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Vicki Davis, What your students really need to know about digital citizenship, EDUTOPIA,
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types of facial recognition software); 5) Property (understanding copyright, licenses for work,
and intellectual property), 6) Permission (knowing how to get permission for work and cite it
correctly); 7) Protection (understanding viruses, malware, phishing, ransomware, and identity
theft); 8) Professionalism (developing online grammar and global competence, understanding
cultural taboos and cultural disconnects, and building problem solving skills); and 9) Personal
Brand (understanding the student voice and awareness of how one is perceived online).559 Had
the students in the reviewed cases had a stronger sense of digital literacy – for example, had they
engaged in more discourse about professionalism on the Internet – it is possible they may never
have chosen to express their concerns or frustrations via social media.
Ultimately, public school officials can take proactive steps in attempt to prevent and
minimize cyberbullying. By establishing a positive school climate that includes positive channels
for communication between students and staff and teaching students social and emotional skills,
school officials can help set the conditions for positive and healthy relationships among all
members of the school community.
Recommendations for School Administrators:
When Situations Arise, Respond with Intention and Thoughtfulness

Despite their best efforts to prevent student cyberbullying, school officials may find
themselves confronting a situation involving student electronic speech that targets school
employees. In such a circumstance, it is important for school officials to respond thoughtfully
and intentionally in order to best support the students and staff involved as well as to prepare
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themselves for any potential litigation. This section provides some questions for school officials
to consider, based on an analysis of the judicial decisions reviewed in this dissertation.

Did The Student Speech Contain Threatening Language?

First, school officials should review the student speech to determine whether it contains
threatening language. Of course, one of school officials’ primary responsibilities is to maintain a
safe school environment. Therefore, threats to anyone’s safety can cause concern among students
and staff alike. It may be a reflection of the gravity of this responsibility that school officials
prevailed in three of the four cases reviewed where the student speech included a reference of
violence toward a staff member. In fact, situations involving threatening electronic student
speech have been one of the only circumstances where lower courts have agreed that school
officials can regulate student speech.
With this in mind, school officials should consider two factors when responding to
student speech perceived as threatening. First, educators should pay attention to the specific
language in the speech, as well as to how various stakeholders perceive this language. Is the
speech formatted as song lyrics? If so, what is the genre of music? If the language used
corresponds with language typical for that musical genre (as Bell argued about his rap song),560 it
will be important to consider whether that same message would have been threatening had it
been presented in a different style. If these questions are not considered, school officials risk
repeating the response Bell identified in his petition. That is, the Bell petition argued that by
In his petition, Bell wrote that the rap song “borrows the rap genre’s most basic conventions by
using hyperbolic and provocative rhetoric as a form of artistic expression.” Brief for the Petitioner
at 2, Bell v. Itawamba, 799 F.3d 379, (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-666).
560
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disciplining the student due to his speech, which was consistent with the rap genre’s basic
conventions, the Fifth Circuit created a “new category of unprotected speech: rap music that was
not a threat, was neither perceived nor intended as a threat, but was nonetheless ‘threatening.’”561
Bell went on, “That decision is profoundly wrong and sends an unfortunate signal that rap is not
on the same First Amendment footing as other genres of music.”562 Ultimately, officials should
think through the specific language used and consider how realistic it would be for the student to
follow through with any specified negative actions. This analysis might help school officials
determine the extent to which the perceived threat is, in fact, a threat to which school officials
need to respond.
Second, if school officials determine student speech does contain threatening language, it
is absolutely essential that they respond accordingly. In Burge, Bethlehem, and Bell, school
officials’ immediate responses to a perceived threat came into question during legal proceedings.
In each of these cases, school officials suspended the student due to threatening language toward
a school official. However, in none of these cases did school officials respond to the student as if
the threatened school employee were truly in harm’s way.563 In some cases, this inconsistency
later led the courts to question the school officials’ responses.
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In Burge, school officials did not conduct an investigation, contact police or mental health
professionals, or remove the student from the classroom. In Bethlehem, school officials contacted
local police and the F.B.I. but did not remove the student from school, separate the student from
faculty or other students, or warn faculty about a possible threat. Similarly, in Bell, school officials
did not separate the student from other students or take any other action to prevent violence.
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These findings highlight the fact that judges will take note of how school officials
immediately respond to a perceived threat. Thus, school officials should develop and follow
specific protocols for responding to student threats, including removing the student from others,
ensuring the student is under constant supervision, and having the student assessed for risk to self
or others. In other words, if school administrators believe the speech to be a threat, they need to
respond accordingly. Ultimately, though situations where a staff member is threatened can be
emotional and stressful for all involved, it will be important for school officials to be thorough
and thoughtful in their responses. By creating a protocol for addressing threats, school officials
can be best equipped to handle any future situation if and when it arises.
Did The Student Speech Cause – Or Is It Reasonably Foreseeable That It Could Cause – A
Material And Substantial Disruption To The Discipline Of The School?

The review of literature indicates that courts are in agreement that Tinker is at least
relevant, and often directly applicable, to cases involving student electronic speech that targets
school employees. Though some individual judges have questioned Tinker’s applicability to
online speech, courts in all thirteen cases reviewed either applied or referenced Tinker and/or the
substantial disruption test. Thus, when school officials are deciding how and when they can
regulate student electronic speech of this type, they must consider the extent to which the speech
caused or had the potential to cause substantial disruption to the school environment. In
addressing these questions, school officials should first consider the federal appellate district
where their school districts are located. School officials within the Second and Third Circuits
might benefit from thinking through the Wisniewski approach to Tinker.
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In The Second and Third Circuits: Was There A Reasonably Foreseeable Risk The Speech
Would Come To The Attention Of School Officials?

In Wisniewski, the Second Circuit held that school officials could discipline a student for
off-campus speech that included violent content where (1) there was a reasonably foreseeable
risk the speech would come to the attention of school officials, and (2) there was a reasonably
foreseeable risk the speech would materially and substantially disrupt the discipline of the
school.564 The review of relevant cases suggests the Second and Third Circuits have referenced
Wisniewski in their Tinker analyses, while most other federal courts have not. It is essential that
school officials working in school districts located within the Second and Third Circuits consider
the Wisniewski questions when making decisions about student electronic speech.
Specifically, the Second Circuit has determined it is reasonable to foresee that student
speech containing violent or offensive language about a school employee or misleading or false
information about a school or school event will come to the attention of school officials and can
therefore be subject to a Tinker-type analysis.565 Therefore, if the student speech in question
contains language or content of this type, school officials may move forward to consider whether
it caused a substantial disruption.
For administrators dealing with these issues within the Third Circuit, school leaders
should consider the student’s intent. Did the student share the speech with others and/or invite
others to contact school officials? If so, school officials may have more justification for
564

Wisniewski v. Board of Education, 494 F.3d 34, (2nd Cir. 2007).

The Second Circuit held the speech in Wisniewski was likely to come to school officials’ attention
because it included violent content directed at school employees. The Second Circuit held the
speech in Doninger was likely to come to school officials’ attention because it was offensive and
contained misleading or false information.
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regulating the speech under Tinker. On the other hand, if the student took steps to keep the
speech private (such as sharing it only with specific friends on a social media website),
Wisniewski may not be sufficient justification for regulating the speech, as it may not have been
foreseeable that the speech would make its way to campus.
Ultimately, school officials need only consider the question of foreseeability if the
schools in which they work are located within the Second or Third Circuits. In these cases,
school officials would benefit from examining the student’s intent more closely. In all other
federal jurisdictions, in accordance with current case law, school officials would be safe
conducting a Tinker analysis. The next step, then, is returning to the question of whether and to
what extent the speech caused a substantial disruption to the discipline of the school.
To What Extent Did The Speech Cause – Or Have The Potential To Cause – A Substantial
Disruption To The Discipline Of The School?

Of the decisions reviewed, the only case where school officials prevailed due to a
substantial disruption having already occurred was J.S. v. Bethlehem. In Bethlehem, the teacher
who was targeted by the student’s speech experienced significant adverse effects as a result of
the speech.566 The court determined that, in this case, school officials had correctly concluded
that the adverse effects of the student’s speech constituted a substantial disruption.567 In the other
cases where school officials prevailed based on Tinker, school officials did not believe that a
substantial disruption had already occurred but rather anticipated that a substantial disruption
could have been possible due to the speech in question.
566
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Knowing this, it will be important for school officials to give significant consideration to
the type of substantial disruption that occurred or could have been forecast to occur. If a staff
member experiences significant adverse effects due to the student speech, such as those
experienced by the teacher in Bethlehem, school officials will likely be seen as justified in
imposing disciplinary action on the student. Further, if the speech contains violent or threatening
language, school officials may be justified in regulating it. However, if the speech contains
vulgar language or expresses negative opinions about school staff in the absence of any specific
threats, it may be more difficult for school officials to effectively argue that the speech could
have caused a substantial disruption. In fact, previous litigation suggests that even violent
language568 and references to sexual conduct between a student and teacher569 may not be
sufficient to justify regulating speech due to Tinker.
Ultimately, the literature review suggests that evidence of a substantial disruption may be
defined as one or more of the following having taken place: a staff member has experienced
significant distress, a threat was posed to a school official, classes needed to be cancelled, or
students engaged in violence at school. In the absence of these situations, school officials may be
hard-pressed to show that substantial disruption occurred as a result of the student speech.
Does The Student’s Speech Address A Potential Matter Of Public Concern?

In the most recent decision reviewed, Bell v. Itawamba, a dissenting judge argued that the
student’s speech should have been protected because the student had been speaking out about a
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See Sagehorn v. Independent, 122 F. Supp. 3d 842 (D. Minn. 2015).

129

matter of public concern.570 Though the Fifth Circuit ultimately ruled in favor of the school
officials in Bell, the question was nonetheless brought forward and will likely continue to be
considered in future case law. Thus, in determining how to respond to student electronic speech
that targets school employees, school officials should consider to what extent the student was
speaking out about an issue that impacted the safety or wellbeing of members of the school
community. If the speech was, in fact, about a matter of public concern, school officials should
consider the message the student was trying to convey and determine whether further response or
investigation is needed. Depending on the circumstances, school officials could choose to defer
disciplinary action for a student who was genuinely expressing a concern about something
occurring within the school community.
What Disciplinary Action Is Appropriate?

Finally, after considering the nature of the student speech and the impact the speech had
on staff and the school at large, school officials should consider what disciplinary action, if any,
is appropriate for the situation. In this review of case law, the students in all cases but one
received at least a suspension as a consequence for their speech. Notably, it is possible that many
school officials dealing with situations of student electronic speech of this kind impose
consequences that are less severe than suspension. Unless these cases were challenged legally,
however, they were not available for legal analysis.
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The Third Circuit in Doninger made it clear that its conclusion may have been different
had more severe disciplinary consequences been imposed upon the student.571 Thus, it seems that
courts may be more apt to defer to school officials’ judgment in situations where less severe
consequences are imposed. As seen in Doninger, courts might allow school officials more
freedom to prohibit a student from running for student government than to suspend a student
from school. In order to prevent potential constitutional conflicts, then, school officials should
consider consequences that do not infringe upon a student’s property right to education.
When making decisions about disciplinary action or decisions about or for students,
school officials should consider how various student characteristics could be impacting their
thinking. For example, if the student speech contained a rap, as it did in Bell, school officials
should be intentional in thinking through any potential implicit biases they may have around rap
music as compared to music from other genres. Bell’s petition to the Supreme Court provided a
compelling example of the ways race and culture may come into play in this type of decisionmaking. In the petition, Bell argued that every genre of music – and every other form of artistic
media – uses violent rhetoric and hyperbole.572 For example, Johnny Cash famously sang, “I shot
a man in Reno just to watch him die,” and Bob Marley and Eric Clapton won critical acclaim for
their song about killing a police officer, “I Shot the Sheriff.”573 Bell wrote, “Of course listeners
do not take any of these lyrics literally. Nor could they. But the [court] majority took Bell’s lyrics
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literally.”574 With these references, Bell implied that school officials and the courts may have
responded more severely to his lyrics simply because they occurred in a rap song, a type of
music often of interest to African American youth.575 Had the student in Bell been of a different
race and/or presented a different type of song with the same underlying message, would school
officials have reacted in the same way? Ultimately, school officials will need to wrestle with
these questions when considering whether and how to discipline students for their controversial
electronic speech.
Potential Areas for Future Research

Looking ahead, it will be important to monitor closely what happens with regard to
student electronic speech that targets public school employees. Of particular relevance will be
the question of how Tinker applies to student electronic speech. How are courts deciding when
Tinker should be applied? To what extent are courts relying on the foreseeability standard
presented in Wisniewski? Further, when Tinker is deemed relevant, what types of situations will
constitute a “substantial disruption” to the school environment? Though Tinker has been long
regarded as a critical foundational tool for all student speech cases, its applicability and utility
has recently come into question. As student speech takes on new forms and new modalities,
courts will be required to be more explicit about the relevance and applicability of this 1969
decision. Thus, school officials would benefit from closely monitoring courts’ use of Tinker in
the years ahead.
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Conclusion

The landscape surrounding issues involving student First Amendment speech rights has
changed a great deal over the past 50 years. In 2018, student speech is more complicated and a
great deal more nebulous than speech communicated via an armband, newspaper article,
assembly speech, or poster. Now, student speech can take place almost anywhere at any time,
and through more channels than the Tinker Court could ever have imagined. For these reasons, it
is time for the Supreme Court to re-examine the question of when and to what extent school
officials can regulate students’ electronic speech that targets school employees. In the meantime,
school officials would benefit from being thoughtful and intentional about how they can prevent
and address student electronic speech that targets school employees.
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Executive Summary: A Tool for School Administrators

Figure 2. A graphic tool for school administrators
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